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ABSTRACT 
 Proper selection of advisory personnel for “transition teams” is critical to military 
advisory efforts in Iraq.  The selection procedures currently in place have shortcomings 
that may be best adjusted through analyzing historical experiences and prior lessons 
learned.  The U.S. military has decades, if not more than a century, of advisory 
experience, to include with Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia.   
 Transition teams’ main purpose is to provide advisory support to the Iraqi 
Security Forces in garrison, training, and combat environments.  Advisors are expected to 
live, work, train, and fight alongside their Iraqi counterparts.  Clearly some personnel are 
better suited than others to such austere and often ambiguous environments.  Therefore, 
discrete selection of appropriate personnel has to be considered for successful advising. 
 Historic lessons learned, coupled with current experience advising Iraqi Security 
Forces, suggest the need to develop discrete selection criteria.  Critical to selection is 
recruitment and screening of candidates.  Personnel that are selected for advisory duty 
should then proceed to a preparatory phase in which advisor-specific skills are developed 
or enhanced prior to deployment.  Assessment should continue through all phases of team 
formation and deployment to ensure that there is no degradation of individual suitability 
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[W]e might be called upon to act as advisors in future counterinsurgency 
wars, as in the past.  In such an event, it is important that we be able to 
draw upon sound and realistic doctrine developed from operational 
experience.  We are creating such doctrine and expanding our knowledge 
of counterinsurgency. 
At the same time, we must not forget that this effort can go for naught if 
we fail to learn how to communicate our knowledge to our friends who are 
doing the fighting, and persuade them to accept our advice.  These are the 
tasks of the military advisor and this is why he is so indispensable in any 
military assistance program.1 
The above quote may seem a recent statement given present operations in the 
Global War on Terror.  Many “transition teams,” consisting of U.S. military advisors are 
being deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan to assist indigenous (host nation) militaries 
conduct counterinsurgency campaigns against brutal adversaries.  In rereading the 
previous quotation, it is critical to note that it was written by a conventional U.S. Army 
officer serving as an advisor…42 years ago while in Vietnam. 
The genesis for this thesis came in October 2005 when I was assigned as the 
Operations Advisor to an Iraqi Special Police Commando Brigade.  While operating in 
Baghdad and Samarra, Iraq, I seemed to constantly receive inquiries from peers regarding 
the expectations for transition team members.  At that time, there was a huge demand for 
advisors, yet no formal curriculum or consistent training programs to prepare advisory 
teams for their job.  Furthermore, the knowledge base and doctrine for counterinsurgency 
for advisory missions within the conventional U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps was at 
best limited. 2   
                                                 
1  Bryce F. Denno.  “Advisor and Counterpart.”  in Robert D. Ramsey III, ed., Advice for Advisors:  
Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present, Occasional Paper 19, Combat Institute 
Studies Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, p. 43. 
2  U.S. Army FM 3-24 defines counterinsurgency (COIN) as “military, paramilitary, political, 
economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.” (p. 1-1 & 1-4). 
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In responding to these inquiries, I gradually organized my thoughts into a 
document that I was able to simply attach to e-mails.  Based on continuous input from 
other advisors, I continued to refine and revise the document over the course of a year.  
The culmination of this effort was published in ARMOR Magazine in September 2006, as 
“Forging the Sword:  Conventional U.S. Army Forces Advising Host Nation (HN) 
Forces.”3 
I felt that this document barely scratched the surface in providing essential 
information to develop effective advisors, as it was based solely on key observations that 
my teams and I made during the one-year transition team tour.  The critical nature of the 
mission of transition teams -- to transition the responsibility for security and stability of 
Iraq from U.S. to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) elements -- demanded a more 
comprehensive and in-depth examination of current and proposed team selection, 
training, education, and utilization. 
Since October 2005, vigorous attention has been given to the task of developing 
and deploying these advisory teams.  Entire organizations have been created to address 
these requirements, and there is a clear professional interest by current, former, and future 
transition team members to further improve the effectiveness and potential of these small 
yet critical organizations.  This thesis will review the history and describe the role of 
military advisory teams, and will conclude with a proposed procedure for selection and 
assessment of potential advisory team personnel for current and future conflicts. 
This thesis draws on written accounts, doctrinal publications, and interviews, as 
well as personal experiences.  Particular attention is paid to current selection methods as 
well as those methods utilized by “elite” units in the U.S. military.  Current practices for 
the preparation and training of advisory teams are examined, and cross-referenced with 
the stated needs of current and past advisors.  Furthermore, some lessons learned from 
other advisory efforts are included to ensure that the best possible framework is 
developed.  The focus of this thesis is on U.S. advisory experiences to emphasize that this 
is not a new undertaking for U.S. forces. 
                                                 
3  Todd J. Clark.  “Forging the Sword:  Conventional U.S. Army Forces Advising Host Nation (HN) 
Forces.”  ARMOR Magazine, Fort Knox, KY, September-October 2006. 
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The tactical U.S. advisory effort in Iraq is conducted at the battalion, brigade, and 
division-levels by small units designated “Transition Teams.”  The transition teams are 
composed primarily of U.S. officers, non-commissioned officers, and locally-hired 
interpreter/translators.  They operate directly with the Iraqi unit, and provide advisory 
assistance in the areas of “intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics, and 
infantry tactics.”4  The composition of a generic combat arms transition team is displayed 
in Table 1.5 
 
Table 1.   Iraq Transition Team Composition 
The null hypothesis of this thesis is that there are a variety of selection, training, 
and implementation procedures and methods currently in place which can be enhanced to 
                                                 
4  JCISFA.  “Transition Team Handbook (Draft).” p. 1. 
5  U.S. Army.  “First Infantry Division Transition Team Training.”  PowerPoint slide briefing (titled 
“Optimized 20 JUL VIP BRIEF version 54”), provided to author by 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division by 
Brigade Executive Officer LTC Curt Hudson.  Combat Arms are primarily those branches of the Army that 
engage in direct combat with enemy forces. 
Team Chief MAJOR
Staff / Maneuver Tnr CAPTAIN





















better man, prepare, and deploy advisory teams.  To elucidate these, I will compare the  
methodology originally adopted with the opinions of current / former advisors, doctrinal 
publications, and historical documents.  Interviews were conducted with personnel of 
varying ranks and military occupational specialties, as well as indigenous forces.  Based 
on these and other research, I will investigate what might be the best course of action for 
selecting and assessing prospective team members, and what might be added by way of 
preparation and training.  
The current focus for U.S. efforts in Iraq is the transition of security duties from 
primarily U.S.-forces to competent Iraqi security forces.  However, it is critical that the 
Iraqi forces only be given responsibility for security duties when they are ready, 
regardless of Americans’ political desires in Iraq.6  This process requires specific 
competencies from both the U.S. and Iraqi sides, and is critical to the transition of 
security responsibility to Iraqi Security Forces.  As such, the effort must “develop and 
build resident capability and capacity in the [Host Nation (HN)] government and security 
forces.”7  To address the process for setting conditions for advisory success, this thesis 
will focus on the methods for selecting the best military personnel for advisor tasks.  In 
doing so, specific qualities, capabilities, and traits will be examined to determine what is 
optimal in advisor selection and assessment.  This project will identify possible 
incentives to attract and keep the best personnel for subsequent advisory requirements.  
Finally, this document will analyze the quality and suitability of advisor preparation and 
training.   
My hope is that this project will offer the means by which the U.S. Army can 
further develop its advisory program from selection through deployment to Iraq.  The 
thesis will only touch on potential organizational considerations, since this deserves a 
                                                 
6  Thomas E. Ricks.  Fiasco:  The American Military Adventure in Iraq.  The Penguin Press, New 
York:  2006, p. 435.  The author quotes retired U.S. Army Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel Kalev Sepp, a 
counterinsurgency expert, in detailing how the U.S. must prosecute the transition of security 
responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).  Sepp states, “To push Iraqi forces to the fore before they 
are ready is not ‘leaving to win,’ it is rushing to failure.”  The long-term security implications for the region 
are far too important to abandon the efforts based on “expedience.” 
7  U.S. Army.  Field Manual 3-24:  Counterinsurgency.  Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
Washington, DC:  December 15, 2006, p. 5-2. 
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study in its own right.  Lastly, this thesis relies heavily on current published 
counterinsurgency doctrine since many aspects of advisory duty – to include work with 
indigenous forces – are based on concepts developed over the years to defeat  
insurgencies.8 
                                                 
8  The current doctrinal publication for counterinsurgency is U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 / U.S. 
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II. TRANSITION TEAM HISTORY 
In early 1962 the United States Army was faced with a fast-breaking and 
new type of challenge in Southeast Asia.  The task was to reorient the 
thinking and to modify the training of large numbers of officers and men 
and to deploy them to Vietnam as advisors in the military effort to stem a 
rampaging and forgotten type of enemy – the guerilla. . . The Military 
Assistance Training Advisor Course at Fort Bragg was developed to give 
combat arms personnel a quick resume in lessons learned from the 
guerrilla wars in recent years.9 
The reorientation described above by a young Vietnam-era Army officer clearly 
intimates that the U.S. Army should be experiencing a major déjà vu in the current 
struggles in Iraq.  As the author notes, if resourceful young personnel were prepared 
ahead of time, they would be well-positioned to perform extraordinary missions 
successfully.  As he goes on to comment, the U.S. reorientation was “a little late but, on 
the whole, not bad.”10   
While there are certainly some parallels between Vietnam and Iraq, the key point 
here is that the U.S. Army has performed fairly well in past advisory efforts, yet routinely 
seems to have been discarded the institutional lessons and disbanded organizations that 
can perform these tasks (with the exception of U.S. Army Special Forces).  In fact, the 
subject of counterinsurgency received scant attention in U.S. military service schools 
from 1975 to 2003.11  Yet past advisors and advisory efforts provide distinct lessons that 
may be applied today in Iraq, and in other contentious areas in the future. 
Ironically, one of the most successful advisory missions in history assisted with 
the establishment of a new nation that would go on to become the sole superpower by the 
21st century.  Major General Baron Fredrick von Steuben, a Prussian Army officer, was 
employed as Inspector General of the Continental Army by General George Washington 
during the American Revolutionary War.  Von Steuben’s efforts helped transform a 
                                                 
9  Richard A. Jones.  “The Nationbuilder:  Soldier of the Sixties,”  in Ramsey, p. 11. 
10  Jones, p. 12. 
11  Richard M. Cavagnol.  Personal correspondence, October 2007. 
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ragtag army of undisciplined farmers and merchants with access to personal weapons into 
a professional fighting force that eventually defeated the British.  The United States was 
thus born, thanks in part to the provision of foreign military assistance.12  
Modern history has seen American advisory units deploy to war-torn areas  to 
both restore order and assist with stability and security.  In the U.S. Civil War 
professional U.S. soldiers trained militias.  Recent U.S. advisory efforts have seen 
significant numbers of both conventional and unconventional (i.e., U.S. Army Special 
Forces, Office of Strategic Services, Central Intelligence Agency, etc.)  forces providing 
advisory elements to France and Yugoslavia during World War II, Greece during the 
post-World War II communist uprising, Korea during that conflict, and several countries 
in Southeast Asia, most notably during the Vietnam War.  Subsequent efforts by the  U.S. 
Army Special Forces include global counterinsurgency and counternarcotics advisory 
missions.  It is clear that the U.S. Army possesses over a century of advisory experience, 
albeit almost one-third of this period has involved almost exclusively special operations 
forces.13  Unfortunately, many of the experiences and lessons learned from these 
endeavors have not been retained or taught in military schools. 
Deploying advisory units to unstable or fledgling allies provides a relatively 
economical means of protecting or furthering U.S. interests in terms of personnel, 
equipment, political, and financial costs.  In this sense, “advisors can be a cheap and 
effective tool.”14  Consequently, advisory elements seem to be the kind of effective 
military, political, and economic tool to satisfy both domestic and international demands.  
Indeed, the “potential benefits of advisory missions [and] relatively low costs of 
operations [ensures] that security assistance missions will continue to be a highly useful 
political tool in the future.”15 
Establishing an effective and efficient methodology for advisory duty must 
provide the basis for doctrinal procedures for such duty.  In light of past advisory efforts 
                                                 
12  O. Kent Strader.  “The Role of the American Advisor,”  in Ramsey, p. 93. 
13  Strader, p. 93. 
14  David L. Shelton.  “Some Advice for the Prospective Advisor,”  in Ramsey, p. 65. 
15  Shelton, p. 69. 
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whose lessons and procedures were lost to time and disinterest, it is critical that advising 
foreign forces becomes a high priority in the military establishment.  In the words of a 
former U.S. advisor to El Salvador:   
[I] do not believe that our doctrinal approach to advisory business should 
be based on luck.  If the job is worth doing, it is worth doing right. . . . I do 
not believe that we have doctrinally learned much from either our ‘loss’ in 
Vietnam or our ‘victory’ in El Salvador. . . . [W]e owe it to our country 
and those we want to help, to get our act together and figure out how to do 
this type of mission.16 
Clearly, the pressing immediate concern is Iraq.  Any government fails “unless it 
maintains a degree of order everywhere.”17  While Iraq was arguably stable during the 
Saddam era, this stability rapidly deteriorated with the invasion of Coalition Forces.  Iraqi 
security forces, both civil and military, essentially disintegrated following the U.S. 
invasion in 2003.  Those that did not abandon their duties were officially disbanded by 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in the Spring of 2003.18  The resulting power 
vacuum necessitated the utilization of Coalition Forces in internal security duties against 
a mounting insurgency.  Actually, the very loss of security and stability granted insurgent 
forces and sectarian militias the opportunity to exert control over the populace.19   
The inability of Coalition Forces to truly penetrate the population then led to 
growing successes by former regime loyalists, militant radical Islamists, and general 
                                                 
16  Gregory T. Banner.  “After Action Report, 2d MILZONE OPATT Chief,” in Ramsey, p. 74. 
17  U.S. Army.  Field Manual 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, p. 1-2. 
18  Ricks, pp. 161-162.  The author further notes that the initial intent for Saddam-era security forces 
was to utilize them for reconstruction-related tasks.  This prospect would prevent large numbers of 
unemployed military-aged males from returning to society.  Past counterinsurgency efforts have revealed 
that a primary concern in developing insurgencies is the availability of this demographic as a manpower 
pool.  The Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance further determined that this activity was 
so critical, that a private contractor must build a “New Iraqi Army” because the U.S. military would “move 
too slow.” 
19  U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, p. 1-7.  FM 3-24 defines security as “[a] condition that 
results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability 
from hostile acts or influences”;  stability is “[maintaining or establishing] a safe and secure environment, 
provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” 
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criminals conducting illegal and / or hostile activities.20  A growing popular perception 
that the Coalition Forces were “occupiers” further galvanized public opinion, accelerated 
by heavy-handed “conventional” tactics favored by the Coalition Forces elements.  Even 
Iraqi units were largely oriented toward conventional methods to deal with potential 
external threats (similar to early efforts with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam).21  
This was unfortunate since, when waging a counterinsurgency, the indigenous population 
must provide the impetus and apparatus to regain stability in terms of security, services, 
and improving economic conditions in the area.22 
Early efforts to create Iraqi units met with limited success.  The initial efforts to 
develop indigenous forces occurred during pre-invasion preparations as the Free Iraqi 
Fighters (FIF), composed primarily of Iraqi expatriates, participated in the 2003 invasion. 
However, this organization failed for a number of performance and political reasons.23  
Subsequently, Coalition Forces began the formation of internal security elements dubbed 
the Iraqi National Guard (ING), trained by a coalition of U.S. soldiers and contractors. 
There was very little emphasis on employing U.S. Army Special Forces for this training, 
despite the fact that they traditionally have the mission of developing indigenous forces.24  
This early effort by the Coalition Forces’ Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance was a planned activity to respond to the huge security vacuum developing in 
the immediate post-invasion period.25  Unfortunately, the ING developed what was at 
best a bad reputation with both Coalition troops and the Iraqi population.26  Problems 
                                                 
20  According to U.S. Army FM 3-24 (p. 1-1), “[a]chieving victory . . . depends on a group’s ability to 
mobilize support for its political interests . . . and to generate enough violence to achieve political 
consequences.” 
21  Ricks, p. 394. 
22  U.S. Army.  Field Manual 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, p. 1-1. 
23  Ricks, p. 124 
24  Ricks, p. 328.  In fact, the Secretary of Defense remarked that using Special Forces was a waste of 
their talents based on their previous performance in Iraq and Afghanistan (presumably conducting “direct 
action” missions that deal directly with applying combat power against enemy forces). 
25  Ricks, pp. 161-162. 
26  Ricks, pp. 147 & 268.  The director of ORHA later stated that “the Iraqi Army was shit,” more 
predisposed to complaining and deserting than conducting required operations.  Later, the author specifies 
that during the Battle of Fallujah in 2004, an Iraqi battalion with “695 soldiers on the rolls, 106 had 
deserted and another 104 [refused to fight] . . . [a]ll of the Iraqi interpreters [quit as well] . . .” (p. 339). 
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only increased as the U.S. downsized forces in certain areas, while giving ISF elements 
responsibility for these areas.  Existing ISF units became completely combat ineffective 
as U.S. forces withdrew;  some units refused to conduct operations at all and were 
allegedly cooperating with enemy forces.27  The reduction of U.S. forces and poor 
communication between U.S. and Iraqi forces resulted in decreasing interaction with 
partner elements.   
The inadequate plan for the development of the ISF, coupled with unsatisfactory 
logistics and support efforts, resulted in virtually no ISF force being capable of executing 
its mission or prescribed duties.28  This inattention had a “corrosive effect” on the ISF 
and stimulated factional frictions during the period 2004-2005.  The failures of past 
efforts to establish a viable Iraqi security apparatus led to the need for a dedicated U.S. 
headquarters charged with ISF development.29  This organization would both oversee the 
formation and development of ISF elements, but also provide connectivity with U.S. 
forces.30  Following the transition of power from the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA) to the Iraqi government in 2004, Iraqi Army (Ministry of Defense [MoD]) and 
Police (Ministry of the Interior [MoI]) forces became the martial implements of the Iraqi 
state.  These units received training and advisors primarily from local U.S. military units, 
although a number of the Iraqi personnel had received some level of training in the Iraqi 
security forces during the Saddam Hussein regime. 
The Iraq situation, particularly given what some label U.S. complicity in the 
degradation of security following the 2003 invasion, remains a divisive issue.  As a 
defense analyst for the Center for Strategic and International studies commented, “No 
single mission is more important than security, and no Iraqi popular desire is clearer than 
that this mission be done by Iraqis . . . [t]he U.S. has been guilty of a gross military, 
administrative, and military failure.”31  Several countries opposed the invasion from the 
                                                 
27  Ricks, p. 333. 
28  Ricks, p. 328. 
29  Ricks, p. 268.  The organization established to oversee the development of all ISF was named the 
Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I). 
30  Ricks, p. 324.   
31  Ricks, p. 341. 
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outset, most notably “staunch” U.S. allies like Germany and France.  But thanks to the 
conduct of the war even in the early stages, many countries that initially supported 
military action, to include the provision of combat forces, no longer overtly support 
continued U.S. activities.  Continued U.S. military action in Iraq provides the impetus for 
condemnations of “American hegemony” and even imperialism.  These international 
assertions continually threaten key U.S. governmental alliances and multilateral 
activities.32 
America itself is deeply divided on the war in Iraq, with most opinion polls 
registering discontent with the current war effort.33  The divide has visibly affected 
American politics, with well-defined rifts between the major political parties;  many 
Americans are reminded of the defeat in Vietnam, and the public’s resolve to halt 
operations there.34  This issue promises to play a major role in upcoming political 
elections as the parties seek favor through distancing themselves from current Iraq 
policies.  Public opinion appears to favor a reduction in troop numbers in Iraq.35  This has 
led to a strong demand for fielding military units that can boost the proficiency of the 
Iraqi Security Forces quickly.  Fortunately, the U.S. military has done advisory support in 
the past; unfortunately, “it did not capture that experience in doctrine.”36   
According to some sources, Iraqi soldiers are more effective than U.S. soldier 
when it comes to certain things.  This realization is apparent to the leadership of U.S. 
commanders in Iraq seasoned by several tours of duty.37  According to the Iraq Study 
                                                 
32  Francis Fukuyama.  “The Clash of Cultures and American Hegemony.”  A Presentation to the 
American Political Science Association, September 1, 2006.  (URL:  http://www.the-american-
interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=178&MId=5), accessed June 11, 2007. 
33  “Iraq” poll.  Pollingreport.com (URL:  http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm), accessed June 11, 
2007.  This site lists multiple domestic U.S. polls from major media outlets. 
34  U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, p. 1-8. 
35  Associated Press.  “Bush Wrapping Up Planning Stage for New Strategy in Iraq.”  FOXNews.com 
Politics Section, January 7, 2007.  (URL:  
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,242254,00.html?sPage=fnc.politics/pentagon), accessed June 11, 
2007  This article is representative of the many available that addresses U.S. public opinion of the Iraq war 
policy. 
36  Robert D. Ramsey IIII.  Advising Indigenous Forces:  American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and 
El Salvador.  Occasional Paper 18, Combat Institute Studies Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, n.d.,, p. 1. 
37  Ricks, p. 416. 
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Group, although there was a need for 10-20,000 troops assigned to work with Iraqi units, 
only around 3-4,000 are currently assigned to transition teams.38  The current 
environment within both international and domestic military, social, and political 
communities, demands a decisive solution to the current turmoil in Iraq.  The primary 
method for expediting the withdrawal of U.S. forces is to develop the competency, 
confidence, and legitimacy of the Iraqi Security Forces.   
In the summer of 2004, the commander in Iraq, General George W. Casey, first 
assigned dedicated U.S. military teams assigned to specific Iraqi units.39  These 
“transition teams” under the overall command of then-Lieutenant General David H. 
Petraeus provided an embedded U.S. military element that assisted in training, equipping, 
and advising indigenous forces, with the rationale that “successful COIN operations 
require a high ratio of security forces to the protected population.”40  The transition teams 
initially were composed of U.S. military personnel from throughout the force (or “out of 
hide”).41  The high demand for transition teams resulted in lowered standards for 
personnel, and an expedited training process that did not adequately address advisor-
specific skills.  In fact, the “advisor effort [was] a low priority in personnel assignment”; 
there were no true selection criteria.42  Later teams were comprised of personnel from 
established units, such as the Active Component / Reserve Component (AC/RC) 2nd 
Brigade, 75th Division (Training Support).  In both cases, the fielded teams drew 
personnel from the entire U.S. military:  active duty, reserve component, and multi-
services.  Most recently, the 1st Infantry Division assumed responsibility for building, 
training, and deploying training teams composed of personnel from throughout the U.S. 
Army.   
                                                 
38  James A. Baker, IIII, and Lee H. Hamilton, et al.  “The Iraq Study Group Report.”  Iraq Study 
Group, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, December, 2007.  p. 49. 
39  Ricks, p. 392-393. 
40  U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, p. 1-2. 
41  Carter F. Ham, Major General, U.S. Army.  “Transition Team’s Role in Iraq.”  Military Training 
Technology Online Archives, originally published in Volume 12, Issue 1, April 10, 2007.  (URL:  
http://www.military-training-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1972), accessed June 11, 2007. 
42  Ricks, p. 394. 
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Meanwhile, personnel continue to be involuntarily assigned as advisors based on 
their absence from current operational deployments, long-term posting at a duty 
assignment, or other “selection” criteria determined by the U.S. Army Human Resources 
Command (HRC).  The tendency to assign “generalist” personnel to the advisory 
mission, rather than “specialists,” mirrors similar practices during the Vietnam War era.43  
In essence, the teams are not being fielded with the optimum personnel for the mission, 
which to a large extent repeats mistakes made with advisory personnel in Vietnam: 
[As replacements debarked a plane, the personnel clerk needed to fill the 
position of a] headquarters commandant for a division advisory 
detachment.  “That armor captain . . . he’ll fit the bill.  Too bad he didn’t 
get here last week when we had a requirement for just the job he’s been 
holding for three years.”44 
The recent focus on building competent and reliable Iraqi Security Forces has 
placed increased emphasis on fielding effective transition teams.  In addition to 
dedicating a combat brigade (1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division) to the training of 
transition team personnel, Human Resources Command (HRC) is exploring various 
incentives for advisor volunteers, such as bonus pay, assignment preference, and 
transition team assignments fulfilling professional duty requirements like required “key 
and developmental positions.”45  However, simply assigning the mission of putting 
together and preparing teams to a traditional U.S. Army combat brigade and advertising 
significant benefits for volunteers (the majority of whom are then selected) does not 
necessarily produce the best possible advisors to help ensure expedient, effective U.S. 
rebuilding of  Iraqi indigenous forces. 
The preparation and training activities currently conducted at Fort Riley, KS, are 
based on command guidance and recent lessons learned.  The training is not exclusively 
                                                 
43  Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.  The Army and Vietnam.  The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, MD, 1988, pp. 208-209. 
44  Jones, p. 14. 
45  Rick Maze.  “DoD May Offer Incentives for Transition Team Duty in Iraq.”  Army Times, ATPCO, 
Springfield, VA, December 6, 2006.  Note that the assignment preference is the only currently approved 
perk and is announced in MILPER 07-034;  MILPER messages may be viewed at the U.S. Army Human 
Resources Command website https://perscomnd04.army.mil/milpermsgs.nsf, although the site requires an 
Army Knowledge Online user name and password). 
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dedicated to advisor skills, and provides general combat readiness and team building 
activities.  Current training suggests that, similar to “relearning” COIN, the U.S. Army is 
also relearning the principles of selecting and preparing personnel to conduct advisory 
missions.46  However, the employment of fielded transition teams still does not follow 
any clear doctrinal model.  Previously, many teams simply conducted a mission analysis 
based on varying commanders’ intent in order to achieve their advisory tasks.  The tasks 
range from providing direct combat roles alongside indigenous Iraqi forces, to conducting 
on-site training assistance, to simply maintaining contact through wireless 
communications and periodic visits to Iraqi units.  But, to optimally employ teams, 
existing or anticipated capabilities need to be taken into consideration in conjunction with 
operational requirements.  These must be identified and addressed in order to achieve (or 
enhance) mission accomplishment. 
While it is obvious that there is a need to build a capacity to select and train 
advisors, we must recognize apparent tendencies within the U.S. Army culture.  First, the 
modern U.S. Army was largely formed and influenced by the Second World War 
(regardless of the numerous successes that Allied forces enjoyed while mobilizing 
indigenous forces, such as Detachment 101 in Burma).47  Large conventional forces 
formed the bulk of the military, and completed the defeat of the Axis powers through set-
piece maneuver and firepower.  Based on this success, the military continued to utilize 
large mechanized conventional formations and strategies in preparing for the “next war.”  
Strict adherence to doctrine, with little deviation, was required to fight the planned initial 
retrograde in the face of numerically superior conventional Soviet forces on the German 
plains.  In essence, the focus was on defeating a familiar foe, following the model 
developed centuries before in Westphalia. 
One major departure during the Cold War period was the advancement of U.S. 
Army Special Forces by President John F. Kennedy in 1961, based on his interest in 
                                                 
46 U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency,  Introduction, p. ix. 
47  OSS-101 Association, Inc, website.  “Detachment 101, Office of Strategic Services, Burma – April 
14, 1942 to July 12, 1945, ‘The American Kachin Rangers’.”  World War II OSS Detachment 101, OSS-
101 Association, Inc (URL:  http://www.oss-101.com/), accessed October 18, 2007. 
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unconventional warfare.48  The Special Forces, developed to influence conflicts “by, 
with, and through” indigenous troops (among other tasks), allowed U.S. military 
intervention by highly influential small units.  Unfortunately, battlefield successes did not 
lead to acceptance, as the conventional Army leaders often considered Special Forces 
soldiers to be renegades.  To this day, there remains significant hesitation by 
conventional leaders to truly accept unconventional units. 
The hesitation to embrace different warfighting concepts also serves to hinder the 
advancement of personnel who do the unconventional while serving in conventional 
units.  For example, an Armor officer who has been an advisor to an indigenous force 
may not be looked upon as favorably by conventional leaders or promotion boards as an 
Armor officer who held a command or “key developmental” position in a conventional 
unit.   
Lastly, the military cultural perception that large conventional forces are the 
“most acceptable” solution for any given conflict prevents adequate resourcing of new 
organizations for three reasons.  First, any effort deemed “less important” will not get the 
attention or funds that can allow it to fully develop.  Second, positions that are deemed 
“less important” will not attract enough ambitious and qualified personnel, especially 
when the potential for professional recognition is less likely.  Third, those who presume 
counterinsurgency operations are merely “small wars” will be prone to assume they can 
be handled by conventional forces and resources at hand.49 
Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of Defense has acknowledged the criticality of 
being able to provide advisory personnel.  Specifically, the Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report stipulates that the U.S. military possess the ability to “train, equip, and advise 
indigenous forces;  deploy and engage with partner nations;  conduct irregular warfare;  
                                                 
48  SpecialOperations.com website.  “Special Forces:  The Early Years.”  U.S. Army Special Forces, 
The Green Berets, Special Forces History and Origins, 2000.  (URL:  
http://www.specialoperations.com/Army/Special_Forces/SF_Info/Detailed_History.htm), accessed June 12, 
2007. 
49  Cavagnol. 
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and support security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations.”50  The clear 
focus on this “indirect technique” for defeating enemies of the U.S. requires a significant 
shift in the U.S. military’s structure and doctrine. 
Currently, 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division (1-1 ID) is responsible for this 
training.  Its mission statement is “On order, the 1st Brigade Combat Team deploys and 
conducts Full Spectrum Operations in support of worldwide contingencies.”51  This 
suggests that the focus is not solely on preparing training teams to deploy to the major 
theaters. 
1-1 ID units are currently configured to train personnel in primarily combat-
oriented subject areas, along with Iraq-specific subjects (language, history, culture, etc).52  
The general model may be appropriate.  However, there is minimal specialization in these 
tasks.  In reality, there are personnel reporting for training who have not been in a tactical 
unit in a long time.  Therefore, significant time has to be spent training standard military 
skills as opposed to specialized advisor-specific skills.53  This is just one indicator that an 
organization tasked with selection (and deselection) of advisor candidates should be 
established.  As previously mentioned, there is no single group currently tasked with 
assessment and selection. 
Instead, 1-1 ID is a reconfigured heavy brigade combat team (see Figure 1).  The 
typical hierarchical structure, with generally standard staff sections, adheres to standard 
military practice and provides leaders and observer-controller / trainers to facilitate 
training.  There is specialization in tasks for most elements, but limited availability of 
subject matter experts.   
                                                 
50  Department of Defense.  “Quadrennial Defense Review Report.”  Washington, DC, February 6, 
2006, p. 42. 
51  1-1 ID.  “Mission Statement.”  Taken from the 1st Infantry Division & Fort Riley, KS, website.  
(URL:  http://www.riley.army.mil/view/article.asp?id=995-2002-05-07-34759-22), accessed June 11, 2007. 
52  Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA).  “Transition Team Handbook 
(Draft),” Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 30, 2007 p. 1.  The U.S. Marine Corps conducts a separate training 
program for their advisory personnel.  While there is collaboration with doctrinal concepts in the sphere of 
advisory operations, future consideration to a consolidated joint advisory training program should be 
considered. 
53  John A. Nagl, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army.  Telephonic interview, April 2007. 
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Figure 1.   1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division organizational chart.54 
 
The organization relies on a standard military structure to create a learning 
institution.  Unfortunately, what it delivers and what is actually needed may be two 
different things.  But even more important is that it first be able to attract capable, 
ambitious soldiers which, in turn, begs the question:  ‘Will serving as an adviser be seen 
as equal to serving as a combat officer in the eyes of the promotion boards? The jury is 
still out.’”55  At a minimum, advisory duty must be viewed with neutrality by promotion 
boards, though the preferred state would be for advisory duty to be considered an asset.  
To ensure that these areas are addressed, a new organization should be established, as 
will be proposed later in this document.  But also, advising as a mission must be 
embraced and supported by senior stakeholders who, in this case, primarily include senior 
Army leaders.  Ideally, they must consider this a vehicle to further advancement within 
the Army.  Likewise, well-regarded senior leaders should facilitate the recruiting of 
personnel for such a key activity regardless of their personal interest in maintaining the 
“best and the brightest” in their own units.   
                                                 
54  U.S. Army.  “1 ID Foreign Security Forces (FSF)  Transition Team Training Mission EMTOE 
Reorganization Approval Brief.”   
55  Fred Kaplan.  “Challenging the Generals.”  The New York Times, Online Magazine, August 27, 
2006, p.5 (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/magazine/26military-
t.html?pagewanted=5&ei=5070&en=fb30cca6f67448c0&ex=1188878400&emc=eta1), accessed August 




















There is currently some thought being given to establishing a permanent Advisor 
Corps.56 Indeed, “the future appears to predict an increased role for the advisor as 
divisions conduct stability and reconstruction operations.”57  Whether this comes about 
or not, advisors need to be properly resourced, which includes having institutional access 
to lessons learned and key requirements for the advisory mission. 
It is a historical truism that there is a constant struggle between providing the best 
personnel to the “regular” forces or to more specialized missions.  Unfortunately, in a 
military organization largely composed of leaders who have prepared for large 
conventional conflicts, quality manning tends to largely go to the traditional conventional 
formations.  As T.R. Frehenbach has put it, “[t]raditionally, a nation instructing another 
should send its best men abroad; traditionally, from Athens to the America of 1950, 
nations do not.”58 
                                                 
56  John A. Nagl, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army.  “Institutionalizing Adaptation:   
It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps.”  Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC, 
June 2007. 
57  Strader, p. 94. 
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III. TRANSITION TEAM MISSION AND ROLES 
An advisor is an implanter of information and ideas.  All other 
considerations must be subordinated to this purpose.  An advisor is a 
mature, dedicated individual who exercises patience and perseverance in 
accomplishing his mission.  An advisor is an individual who does not 
attempt to Americanize everyone he meets;  rather he helps people make 
of themselves what they want, not what the advisor wants.59 
 
T.E. Lawrence thoroughly documented the complexities involved in helping 
advise and form an Arab army during the early 20th century.  In fact, he addressed the 
task as “an art, not a science, with exceptions and no obvious rules,” and his “Twenty-
Seven Articles” continues to be an excellent guide for U.S. advisors in Iraq.60  Ironically, 
while the outcome of his efforts are well-documented, the fate of those he helped is once 
again being shaped by a new generation of advisors. 
The mission of the transition team is to “provide advisory support and direct 
access to coalition effects to enhance the ability of Iraqi forces to operate independently.  
The teams will have knowledge to assist the appropriate level staffs in tactics, military 
decision-making process, counter-insurgency warfare, leadership, team work, 
communications, and urban combat.  In addition, the [transition team] will bring a 
background of combat arms management and organizational experience.”61  To achieve 
this, “[a]ll land forces assigned to this high-priority mission [of advising] need thorough 
training, both before deploying and in theater.”62     
                                                 
59  Irving C. Hudlin.  “Advising the Advisor.”  in Robert D. Ramsey III, ed., Advice for Advisors:  
Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present, Occasional Paper 19, Combat Institute 
Studies Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, p. 45. 
60  T.E. Lawrence.  “Twenty-Seven Articles,” in Ramsey, p. 3.  The original version of this document 
was printed in The Arab Bulletin, August 20, 1917, and is available at 
http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1912/27arts.html.   
61  Iraqi Assistance Group.  “OIF Transition Team Mission.”  Taken from the 1st Infantry Division & 
Fort Riley, KS, website.  (URL:  http://www.riley.army.mil/view/article.asp?id=583-2007-02-21-33387-
72), accessed June 11, 2007. 
62  U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, p. 6-3. 
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Another reference stipulates that the general mission of transition teams includes 
each of the following:63 
- Train, advise, and mentor host nation (HN) security forces in the 
planning, coordination and execution of security operations. 
- Advise and assist host nation security forces in training, employing, and 
sustaining security forces in combat, counter-insurgency operations, and 
other security operations in order to enhance their capacity to conduct 
independent operations. 
- Demonstrate the highest standards of leadership and to develop 
leadership traits and principles of host nation forces. 
All transition teams are expected to follow the Security Force Assistance 
Imperatives:  understand the operational environment, employ effective leadership, 
ensure legitimacy, ensure unity of effort/purpose, manage information, and ensure 
sustainability.64  The assets that the advisor provides are said to include both the 
knowledge and proficiency in tactics, techniques, and procedures, and also the talent to 
share this knowledge in an appropriate manner with host nation forces while being 
embedded with counterpart Iraqis.65  “The measure of an advisor’s success or failure is 
the performance by his counterpart.”66   
Other admonitions are: 
 “[The] transition team job is to coach, teach, and mentor.”  (GEN 
Petraeus, Commander’s Guidance letter to Transition Team members, 8 
May 2007). 
“It is critical to understand and work within the Iraqi culture.”  (GEN 
Petraeus, Commander’s Guidance). 
“[Transition Teams] will live, work, and operate with [Iraqi] units.”  (LTG 
Odierno, Commander’s Welcome letter to Transition Team members). 
                                                 
63  JCISFA.  “Transition Team Handbook (Draft),” p. 1. 
64  JCISFA, “Advisor Basics.” 
65  JCISFA.  “Transition Team Handbook (Draft),” p. 1. 
66  Denno, p. 33. 
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What these statements imply is that transition team preparation must consist of:  
military training and civilian subject matter.  In particular, transition team “preparation . . 
. requires more than mastering Service doctrine;  they must also be trained and 
educated.”67 
As described, the teams are expected to bring military tactical and operational 
experience and leadership principles to the developing Iraqi units.  The teams routinely 
perform these duties in extremely difficult, remote, and often dangerous environments.  
In most cases, teams participate in combat operations alongside their Iraqi counterpart 
units.     
Because of the conditions under which transition teams operate, their mission 
must be clearly defined by the responsible chain of command and internalized by the 
team members.  Attention must be given to the scope, goals, objectives, procedures, 
actions, and limitations of transition teams.  Ambiguity and lack of clear understanding of 
the mission all too easily lead to non-unity of effort.  For instance, in one 2005 case the 
team NCOIC believed that the team should conduct strictly training support, the 
operations officer believed that the team must include actual combat advising, and others 
were convinced that the team should only focus on resourcing the supported Iraqi force.  
In reality, the mission included integrating all of these actions, with the addition of other 
key tasks such as providing access to Coalition Forces effects (e.g., battlefield operating 
systems, such as air support, indirect fire support, intelligence, etc), conducting liaison 
with adjacent units (Coalition Forces, Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, other U.S. governmental 
agencies, and non-governmental agencies), and even participating in social activities 
(e.g., feasts, religious celebrations like Eid al-Fitr, etc). 
It is essential that the roles and responsibilities of the transition team be 
thoroughly understood by all parties involved.  Indeed, it is as critical for adjacent 
conventional U.S. units to understand the purpose of the transition team as it is for 
individual team members to understand their role.  Likewise, indigenous forces should be 
aware of the capabilities and limitations of their assigned team to maximize the 
                                                 
67  U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, p. 1-28. 
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partnership.  The integration of all major players creates an environment where they can 
act with minimal friction and enhanced effectiveness. 
Essentially, team members are combat advisors who are “organized, equipped, 
educated, and trained to develop host nation security forces abroad.”68  This demands certain 
individual knowledge, skills, and abilities, along with advanced COIN- and advisor-









                                                 
68  John A. Nagl.  “Institutionalizing Adaptation:  It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps.”   
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IV. TRANSITION TEAM SKILLSET DISTILLATION 
We need mature people as advisors, people who are soldier-diplomats.  
We do not need advisors who sacrifice their mission because of concern 
for efficiency reports and their chances on the next promotion list. . . . To 
be successful we must go beyond the impersonal approach and tear down 
the fences in which we surround ourselves.  We must sink our feet deep 
into the soil of the host country  so that our planting will bring a 
bountiful harvest of peace.69 
T.E. Lawrence is an example of an excellent advisor candidate.  Although he was 
not a career military man, he nonetheless was able to perform extraordinary acts with his 
indigenous counterparts.  Lawrence possessed the following key attributes:70 
He had years of training in the region [and his] unique situational 
understanding  came from his academic background, his linguistic skills, 
his deep cultural understanding, his years in the region, his personal 
relationship with his counterpart, his understanding of what was and was 
not possible, his constant awareness of what was going on around him, 
and his unique genius. 
Personnel selected to conduct advisory missions require proficiency in more 
capabilities than those provided soldiers for conventional combat operations.71  
Meanwhile, “[l]earning done before deployment results in fewer lives lost and less 
national treasure spent relearning past lessons in combat.”72  While standard combat 
requires the soldier or unit to “shoot, move, and communicate,” advisory duties require 
additional attention to non-military aspects of unit and staff development;  “[s]ome types 
of personalities are just unacceptable for this type of work.”73  Even basic intellectual 
attributes, such as clear writing and speaking skills, must be addressed based on the need 
to provide information to many different target audiences.74 
                                                 
69  Hudlin, p. 47. 
70  Ramsey, p. 1. 
71  Strader, p. 100. 
72  U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, Introduction, p. ix. 
73  Banner, p. 82. 
74  Strader, p. 102. 
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Military skills proficiency, such as marksmanship and physical fitness are 
undeniably core military skills.  Indeed, they are regulated requirements for every 
Soldier.  The main reason for selecting individuals who already possess these skills 
would be to spend more time on developing advanced rather than basic military skills.  
Centers responsible for preparing transition teams should not be bringing individuals up 
to the “standard.”  Instead, specialized training needs to start sooner.  Also, the training 
regimen must create an environment in which teams can work not only to develop and 
strengthen individual team members, but those of the team as a whole.75 
The high demand for advisory personnel necessitates that advisor training must 
focus on the development (or enhancement and refinement) of the military skills 
necessary for small units operating with indigenous forces in austere environments.  The 
training must lead to a team that has the combat power to survive on the battlefield, yet 
one that leaves a small footprint.76  Such training is essential to success and must be 
given a high priority.  Unfortunately, many of the non-military subject areas are not 
easily assimilated by all soldiers and officers.77  Further, the end state for this preparation 
must be teams that can employ their tactical, technical, and educational skills, by sharing 
and developing this knowledge with their assigned ISF unit.78 
In developing such capabilities, the Quadrennial Defense Review specifies that 
the U.S. military must “understand foreign cultures and societies and possess the ability 
to train, mentor and advise foreign security forces and conduct counterinsurgency 
campaigns.”  Further, advisors must possess and demonstrate the following attributes:   
- Language and cultural awareness to facilitate the expansion of partner 
capacity. 
- The ability to communicate U.S. actions effectively to multiple 
audiences, while rapidly countering enemy agitation and propaganda. 
                                                 
75  U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, p. 6-14. 
76  Denno, p. 39. 
77  U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, Introduction, p. x. 
78  JCISFA.  “Transition Team Handbook (Draft).”  p.1 
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- Joint [and coalition] coordination, procedures, systems and, when 
necessary, command and control to plan and conduct complex interagency 
operations. 
- [P]roficient in irregular operations, including counterinsurgency and 
stabilization operations.79  
What is key is to leverage our partners, who “have greater local knowledge and 
legitimacy with their own people and can thereby more effectively fight terrorist 
networks.”80   
 Notice that the principal focus of transition teams is to survive socially in the 
indigenous environment.  The small size and unique mission of advisory teams requires 
that teams provide more than combat power.  They must also co-habitate and conduct 
operations with the indigenous force, show their willingness to share in hardships, and 
demonstrate constant situational awareness of current requirements and trends.81  As 
such, the teams must be proficient in the skills of warrior-diplomats.82  The advisor must 
be “an advisor and a nationbuilder as well as a soldier.”83  President John F. Kennedy 
stated that: 
You [military professionals] must know something about strategy and 
tactics and logistics, but also economics and policy and diplomacy and 
history. You must know everything you can know about military power, 
and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must 
understand that few of the important problems of our time have, in the 
final analysis, been finally solved by  military power alone.84 
Simply, the team members must be compatible with the indigenous forces with 
which they will work. Because advisors must understand key aspects of their 
counterparts’ culture in order to “achieve a degree of influence” – which is undeniably a 
                                                 
79  Department of Defense, p. 23-24, 42. 
80  Department of Defense, p. 23. 
81  Ricks, p. 340. 
82  U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, p. 2-8. 
83  Jones, p. 13. 
84  Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies website (http://www.nps.edu/CSRS/), Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, accessed September 4, 2007. 
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key component of the advisory mission -- team members must study and develop 
adequate knowledge of the culture, language, and history of their advised force.85  As 
was discovered by advisors in Vietnam: 
No specific set of rules can be written for bridging the cultural gap and 
overcoming the barriers to cooperation that arise in the highly diverse 
relationships between U.S. advisors and their Vietnamese counterparts.  
The effectiveness of the advisory group could be substantially increased, 
however, through three basic endeavors: improving the selection of U.S. 
advisors;  devising training programs that will make advisors sensitive to a 
variety of possible situations;  and providing an administrative setting that 
will allow individual advisors to use their skills to best advantage.86 
As representatives of the U.S., and as critical elements of U.S. policy, transition 
teams must expect to be both targets of enemy forces and objects of curiosity for 
counterparts and the local population.  In order to respond to this, advisors must be well-
versed and comfortable discussing important local, national, regional, and international 
topics.  Advisors must also be comfortable with participating in such discussions in 
public settings with many onlookers, some of whom will invade their personal space.  
Individuals who dislike such interactions are not suited to be advisors.  Conversely, 
gregarious individuals should do fine.87  While being the “center of attention” should not 
be a primary motivation for an advisor, he must be prepared to be thrust into that position 
by a curious and active population.88 
The ability to establish rapport is an undeniable necessity for a military advisor.89  




                                                 
85  Jones, p. 12, & U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, p. A-1. 
86  Hickey, p. 146. 
87  Strader, p. 101. 
88  Shelton, p. 68. 
89  rapport. (n.d.). The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. 
Retrieved October 22, 2007, from Dictionary.com website: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/rapport.  
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lasting impressions.  Comportment, knowledge, skill, background, and performance all 
assist in developing rapport.  The following description from the Vietnam-era holds true 
for any advisory mission: 
The greater the advisor’s professional competence and his ability to 
establish rapport with the man he is advising, the more likely is it that the 
counterpart will accept and act on his advice.  One quality without the 
other will greatly diminish the effectiveness of the American.  
Professional expertise is a requirement both  obvious and easily 
measurable, and it has been the crucial problem in the advisor-counterpart 
relationship.  A faculty for effective interaction with a foreign national, 
and the skills necessary to developing and expressing that faculty, are 
much more intangible.90 
The potential for frequent and close interaction with the indigenous population 
demands comportment standards.  As previously stated, the transition team is an 
extremely visible representative of the United States government.  Therefore, each 
member must display impeccable comportment in dealing with local civilians and with 
host nation military personnel (not to mention chance encounters with members of 
various media and Non-Governmental Organizations).  The requirement for advisors is to 
conduct themselves “above reproach.”  Regardless of their personal views, which may 
contrast with local “views and customs about what is financially, morally, or legally 
acceptable,” advisors must not make waves.91  It is critical that an individual be capable 
of “observ[ing] both himself and others [while] in a foreign culture, and should be ready 
to introduce self-corrective measures when necessary.”92 
In order to fully appreciate why this is important, and what – in particular – is 
locally sensitive, it is important that a person “be a learner before he can be an advisor 
and hence cultivate a habit of inquiry and interest with respect to another society.”93  
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There is clearly a large void when it comes to cross-cultural exposure in military 
schooling, although there is certainly the benefit of exposure to foreign personnel.  This  
is useful for helping individuals determine whether they would want to work with foreign 
forces.  Personnel with little interest in foreign counterparts are unlikely to embrace a 
foreign culture, develop understanding and respect for counterpart problems and 
solutions, learn a foreign language, or bond with member of an indigenous force.94  Self-
driven study of foreign cultures, traditional local governmental apparatus, and principles 
of COIN, are also indications of an individual’s potential for advisory duty;  if he is 
interested in a subject, he is more likely to fully embrace it. 
When evaluating the performance and abilities of indigenous personnel and units, 
it is critical that Americans be able to appreciate local capabilities and limitations.  U.S. 
advisors who judge indigenous forces based on American values, attitudes, and behavior 
patterns, may shortchange their counterparts.  Local behavior, as well as military 
practices, may appear lazy, incompetent, dishonest, or wasteful from an American point 
of view.  In actuality such behavior may simply be a consequence of local practice -- this 
is why it is essential that advisors have a good understanding of the host nation culture.95 
At the same time, the common understanding of basic universal values builds the 
framework to establish relationships.96  Universal values such as courage are 
immediately recognizable and respected by warriors in any civilization, and are easily 
discernible on the battlefield.  Likewise, disloyalty is universally unacceptable in a 
potential comrade.  Unfortunately, even these lines can blur in counterinsurgencies given 
shifting loyalties, individuals looking out for themselves and / or their family’s well-
being, or significant emotional events that might change an individual’s outlook.  It is 
critical that advisors not indulge in “mistaken assumptions that the [indigenous forces] 
want the same things as Americans [because it may lead to] useless projects [and cause] 
frustration as well as friction with counterparts and local leaders.”97 
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Advisors are expected by the United States government, their respective chain(s) 
of command, and host nation force to provide crucial information relating to host nation 
capabilities and limitations.  Furthermore, advisors must provide honest and selfless 
counsel to their host nation counterparts.98  They are also, 
one of the most important channels for the communications of political 
information between the United States and the host country, and they are 
in touch with segments of the indigenous population that are not reached 
by any other U.S. personnel.99 
Therefore, advisors need to exhibit impeccable integrity in their dealings with others 
(whether U.S. forces, ISF, or members of their own team).100  This extends to promises 
made.  Advisors must have the perseverance to carry through with all specified, implied, 
or otherwise promised tasks.101 
None of this is possible if an individual has difficulty communicating with others.  
The ability to get a point across in a manner that is both understandable and amenable to 
the target audience is critical.  Individuals who have a poor “bedside manner” are not 
suitable for a transition team, since “success depends on the degree to which the advisor 
can establish credibility with his counterpart[s].”102   
For the advisor to avoid this, he must be capable of changing the way he views his 
environment, particularly by trying not to see things through American eyes.  As an 
outgoing American general wrote when he departed Vietnam: 
Of course, the advisor must try to see the situation as it looks through 
Vietnamese eyes;  this is part of the insight he strives for – not simply 
understanding the way Vietnamese in general look at matters, but also 
how his Vietnamese, his counterpart, does.  What are the biases, 
constraints, pressures, and so on, that make up his real world?  In all of 
this, the American has to understand that he is not Vietnamese.  He is only 
temporarily in the country, and he will be exceptional indeed if in his tour 
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he understands a small fraction of how Vietnamese look at  their situation 
and themselves.  But everything he suggests should be tested against the 
question ‘how does this fit into the Vietnamese way?’  Furthermore, it is 
very important to understand ‘the way things move’ and to take advantage 
of natural movement. 103  
After establishing rapport with his counterpart, the next challenge is to use that 
rapport to impel action.  An individual who can communicate well, but is unable to impel 
his counterpart to take necessary action is hardly effective in an advisory situation.104  
Communicating requires some understanding of the local language (to include both 
verbal and non-verbal cues), as well as good negotiating skills and an ability to read his 
counterpart.105 
An advisor must “influence the behavior of others over whom he has no authority, 
causing them to do things that may be foreign to their nature and habit, at the same time 
attempting to interpret, implement, and respond to criticisms of U.S. political decisions 
over which he has no input or control.”106  Therefore, there must be some indication that 
the potential advisor is adept at interpersonal relationships, and can be influential, 
credible, and motivational.  Traits such as arrogance and anger will be far less well-
received than a calm and soft-spoken demeanor, along with an affable and pleasant 
attitude.107 
An advisor may well be compared to a salesman who has “a worthwhile product 
that will help [the consumer] immeasurably if the consumer just learns a bit more about 
it.”108  In order to accomplish this task, the “salesman” must learn about his customer, 
learn about the area, and thoroughly understand the product in order to develop a positive 
reputation.  This demands an inquisitive and focused nature.  For instance, it appears that 
“Arabs respect negotiation, haggling is expected . . . because negotiation is inseparable 
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from advising,” necessitating a bit of negotiation skill to “sell” your “product.”109  A true 
understanding of the “customer” is accomplished when the advisor can use his 
knowledge and panache to accomplish his advisory mission while always ensuring that 
his counterpart is the primary overt executor of decisions.   
In building the team, and subsequently accomplishing the requirements of 
advising host-nation forces, every effort must be made to co-locate the team with the 
advised unit.  This serves several purposes, foremost among them being proximity.  If 
transition teams are geographically separated from their "client" units, they miss the 
necessary frequent interaction and availability for both units; “[i]t is impossible and 
unrealistic to expect someone to commute and have a meaningful relationship with a 
unit.”110  Colloquially referred to as “drive-by advising,” this minimizes time spent with 
the client unit on a daily basis. It also heightens the likelihood of encountering hazards 
just given extended periods of movement since long-distance commutes to the supported 
indigenous increases the probability of enemy attack on the small transition team element 
while traveling.  It also may create an impression of lack of trust between the team and 
client unit.  As a former advisor commented, there was a common joke among the El 
Salvadoran military that “[t]he Spanish word ‘Asesor’ which means ‘Advisor,’ really 
means ‘one who tries to tell us how to run a war without ever having been there’.”111   
Indeed, one of the earliest U.S. advisors to the ISF solidified the bond between his 
team and the ISF unit by co-habitating and fighting alongside them.  He was 
subsequently awarded one of the few Distinguished Service Crosses bestowed in the 
Global War on Terror, as well as an eminent Iraqi decoration.112  Sharing hardships can 
lead to strong mutual loyalties among advisors and their counterparts.  This loyalty can at 
times lead to “going native” problems.  It is thus critical that potential advisors are  
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reliable and faithful to their nation and team first, and counterparts second; it is critical 
that individuals be capable of understanding where very ambiguous loyalty lines are 
drawn.113 
When the advisor teams live, eat, and sleep with their host-nation partners, a 
stronger more familiar relationship develops.  The amount of time spent with 
counterparts has a “direct and important bearing on their relationship and in many cases 
determines the advisor’s success in winning [respect and cooperation].”114  As Vietnam 
experiences indicate, advisors who “share[d] food and bivouac and even the dangers of 
battle . . . show[ed] the highest incidence of good rapport and successful 
collaboration.”115  Co-location also allows more frequent organized and hip-pocket 
training opportunities, and prevents "training to time" rather than to standard.  By 
increasing joint training opportunities, co-location is more likely to yield an accurate 
assessment of capability.    
Co-location places the advisory team in position to immediately deploy with the 
unit on hasty missions.  This is critical because host nation units cannot always wait to 
execute short-notice missions until the arrival of their advisors.  Considering all of the 
benefits to co-locating with the supported ISF unit, teams must be trained in site 
selection.  Situating the team with the ISF unit in the appropriate location on the 
indigenous facility requires teams learn the criteria by which to select their base of 
operations. 
The nature of advisory duties will surely generate significant levels of frustration 
for transition team personnel.116  Advisors must be capable of multi-tasking with 
occasionally uncooperative or disinterested counterparts.  Historically, U.S. advisors have 
often served as acquisition or supply personnel in the eyes of the host nation personnel.  
Such attitudes can create significant levels of annoyance.117  Advisors likewise need to 
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be flexible about the concept of time; a counterpart’s “attitude is not always appreciated 
by an American advisor who resents what sometimes strikes him as [an] eight-to-five 
o’clock attitude towards his nation’s supposedly life-or-death struggle.”118  Therefore, 
advisors must exhibit patience and tolerance in order to maintain their peace of mind.119  
Clearly, there are some individuals who are too “high strung” and therefore must be 
considered unsuited for transition team duty. 
Another essential trait of successful advisors is the need for adaptability.  
Common doctrine, standard operating procedures, and regulations are instilled into the 
professional U.S. Soldier.  Unfortunately, host nation counterparts may have far different 
methods or beliefs, many of which have been developed through years of experience or 
are cultural in nature.  The advisor must be an individual who is capable of rapid 
adjustment to changing situations, rather than an individual completely tied to American 
military routine or doctrine.120 
Another key advisor attribute is empathy for others – “understanding and 
appreciating another person’s viewpoint, ideals, mores, and objectives in life.”121  The 
advisor must literally attempt to place himself in his counterpart’s shoes.  While U.S. 
personnel will invariably leave after a relatively short “tour of duty,” the counterpart will 
live with the conflict until it is complete, until he leaves the country, or until he is dead.  
Empathy is also related to the ability to transcend existing historical cultural differences 
that exist between the West and non-West.  Because flamboyance or showboating can 
easily derail the potential to develop bonds, humility is another critical attribute for any 
advisor.122   
Humility demands that the advisor “accept that his successes may be few and that 
such progress that is made will likely be the result of the seeds that he plants and that his 
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successors bring to fruition.”123  Changes will be slow in many cases, based not only on 
the initial proficiency of the indigenous security forces, but also on cultural acceptance of 
changes weighed against age-old practices.  Therefore, the advisor must set realistic goals 
that fit the unit’s capabilities rather than goals that might be ideal according to theory. 
At first glance it might seem that no one harboring deep-rooted stereotypes, 
biases, or racism against a particular group of people should be an advisor.  However all 
people generalize and stereotype to a degree.  There are even military cultural generalities 
that might be exhibited, such as the well-established assumptions about the specific roles 
and responsibilities of rank.  Even these generalities must be somewhat tempered in order 
to provide effective assistance to foreign units, in which rank may not relate to authority, 
but may relate more to lineage or seniority of service.124  What is important is that 
prospective advisors be able to overcome their biases. Advisors cannot display them 
when dealing with their counterparts, much as individuals in U.S. society should not base 
their treatment of others on prejudice.125  In considering an individual’s potential for such 
cultural tolerance, it is worth considering that members of minority groups or multi-
cultural backgrounds (such as immigrant or multiracial backgrounds) may display an 
increased cultural sensitivity, adaptability, and integration into indigenous societies.126 
In contrast to prejudice, some life experiences are valuable, and may be difficult-
to-impossible to train.  Insight, or the ability to “see the situation as it really is,” may be 
considered an essential attribute.  Often, insight comes from an individual’s “willing 
openness to a variety of stimuli, from intellectual curiosity, from observation and 
reflection, from continuous evaluation and testing, from conversations and discussions, 
from review of discussions, from review of assumptions, from listening to the views of 
outsiders, and from the indispensable ingredient of humility.”127  At the same time, over-
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confidence in advisors is detrimental;  “the man who believes he has the situation entirely 
figured out is a danger to himself and his mission.”128 
Because advisors must be capable of making rapid and decisive judgments in 
ambiguous situations, we could say a certain level of “street smarts” is desirable.  Careful 
consideration of an individual’s background should reveal how an individual will react in 
demanding situations.129  But, the tendency of Americans to be “pragmatic, systematic, 
direct, and urgent” also needs to be taken into account.   As a corollary to many Iraqi 
observations of U.S. troops, a Filipino observer of U.S. efforts in Vietnam noted that “It 
is . . . evident that the rush-rush-rush nature of the American way of doing things simply 
is far out of mesh with the slow and deliberate Asian way of getting things done.”130  In 
many cases, Americans’ behavior might simply reflect the fact that they are serving with 
other Americans;  their behavior might change when embedded with non-Americans.  
This, too, is something that selection should consider. 
Selecting an individual for advisory duty requires identifying desirable skills and 
personal attributes.  The identification of these traits should enable the U.S. Army to 
focus on specific personnel, and also provide an indication to potential advisor candidates 
of how well they potentially fit the advisory mission.  With this it should be possible to 
establish specific screening, selection, and assessment processes. 
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V. TRANSITION TEAM SELECTION AND ASSESSMENT 
The time has come to introduce greater precision and, more important, 
greater thoroughness in our counterinsurgency personnel policies. . . . We 
must identify the areas of the world which will be in contention over the 
next decade so that the most time-consuming training . . . can be started 
now. . . . The task then becomes one of selecting the right individual for 
the job – the individual whose background, interest, and personality serve 
as bases on which to place the building blocks of extensive cultural 
background and economic problems and possibilities.131 
The above was penned by a young U.S. advisor to the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam (ARVN) over 45 years ago.  It remains eerily relevant today, particularly as the 
Iraq conflict continues and the potential for new conflicts grows.   
Critical to the success of the advisory effort is the resourcing of the advisory 
teams.  Team members must be selected for their knowledge, skills, abilities, attitudes, 
and exemplary service.  Once team members are identified and teams assembled, an 
intense preparation regimen must be conducted.  This preparation must be focused on 
many activities, such as physical readiness, foreign internal defense principles, small unit 
tactics, community policing, weapons proficiency (U.S. and host nation), employment of 
combined arms, combatives (unarmed combat), language training, cultural awareness, 
communications, combat lifesaver, and tactical maneuver.   
Selection of the proper personnel for any task is critical to achieving the desired 
result.  In fact “[c]ommanders must assign the best qualified Soldiers and Marines to 
training and advisory missions . . . and may require using Reserve Component 
personnel.”132.  Reserve component personnel, in general, may tend to be outstanding 
candidates for advisory duty because of interpersonal skills they have developed in the 
civilian environment and the life experiences that they can bring to bear.   
There are two manpower considerations:  fielding the cadre and filling the teams.  
Both draw from personnel already in the U.S. Army.  Although it is worth contemplating 
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the inclusion of joint, interagency, and perhaps international personnel in order to field 
truly effective teams, that is beyond the scope of this study.  To field effective teams, the 
“cadre” must seek to provide true expertise.  This may require involuntary assignment of 
selected former transition team personnel since there is absolutely no substitute for first-
hand experience (especially foreign and combat duty).133  At the same time, cadre should 
include those who can cover the military aspects of training as well as more 
academically-oriented coursework.  Most academic experts are available only in the 
civilian realm, where entire lives are dedicated to the study of a specific niche.  Building 
the cadre team, to include subject matter experts, will best prepare the transition teams for 
the complex environment that is Iraq.  Ideally, the cadre should be comprised of both 
military and civilian experts who are capable of assessing and evaluating the capabilities 
and limitations of candidates.  The best candidates for cadre and other staff are 
individuals who have experience in the subjects that they are teaching or training.   
For personnel to be attracted to an organization, there must be some prestige 
associated with it;  most soldiers want to be a part of a good outfit.  Prestige is a by-
product of things such as an illustrious organizational history, prominent past members, 
significant accomplishments, having state-of-the-art equipment, being well looked after 
by the military, etc.  Traditionally, advisory duty has at best been viewed with disinterest 
by conventional military personnel and at worst was considered a career killer.  It was 
“not considered particularly desirable, important, or popular.”134  Because of this, 
advisory duty has often been associated with some type of incentive(s).  An interesting 
study conducted in 1957 determined that given the isolation and operational tempo of 
being on advisory duty, advisors required “more frequent R&R than personnel serving 
with U.S. units.”135  During the late Vietnam War period, volunteers for advisory duty 
“included a personal letter of invitation from the [Chief of Staff of the Army];  promotion 
preference;  location preference in South Vietnam;  preference for next assignment;  
special accommodations for family either stateside, Hawaii, or Guam;  a  two-week leave 
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with family in Hawaii after 12 months;  and a 30-day leave.”136  This represents an 
extremely generous incentive package, and a similar modern program might well be 
exploited both for recruiting and retention purposes. 
However, in today’s environment additional incentives might likewise be 
considered, such as the granting of Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI) for a soldier’s 
Primary Military Occupational Specialty (PMOS), a special skill insignia or tab (similar 
to a “Ranger” tab), or further specialty schooling (such as Pathfinder, Air Assault, etc).137  
Additional pay for this special duty could serve as another inducement, as is indicated by 
the many targeted special pays for understrength MOSs or hazardous duty for individuals 
on “jump status.”138  However, financial inducements can also attract individuals for the 
wrong reasons.  The goal should be to attract individuals with the desire to be advisors 
based on their ambitions and deep interest in a duty that is “vexing, enriching, 
challenging, and memorable,” rather than an ultimate interest in a larger salary. 139  
Certainly, the promise of combat duty appeals to many in the Army.140  Although 
we are an Army at war, there are many personnel who have not yet been “in the right 
place at the right time,” and have therefore not participated in combat operations in Iraq 
or Afghanistan.  Along with assignment to Iraq, comes the inevitable Shoulder Sleeve 
Insignia – Former Wartime Service (SSI-FWS), colloquially referred to as the “Combat 
Patch.”  There is also the significant possibility of a soldier earning the coveted Combat 
Infantryman’s Badge (CIB), Combat Medic Badge (CMB), or Combat Action Badge 
(CAB), for direct combat with the enemy. 
It must be noted that in order to attract high-quality personnel there must be some 
type of incentive for not only volunteering for advisory duty, but for serving subsequently 
as cadre.  Again, choice of duty station, possible monetary incentives, and possible credit 
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for completion of Key Developmental Positions are notable considerations.  
Consideration could also be given to increasing the value of these positions when 
personnel boards review individuals for promotion. 141   
With the appropriate cadre in place, we can turn to selecting the candidates for 
transition teams.  As already indicated, these personnel must be mature, professional, 
competent, patient, knowledgeable, confident, culturally effective, situationally aware, 
and capable of operating with small teams in austere environments – all while being 
embedded in an indigenous force.142  Some of these attributes, such as maturity, may be 
correlated with age or rank.143  However, this warrants further study, since candidates 
also must be willing and capable of taking initiative and setting the standards for others to 
follow.144  Combat experience can be an indicator of potential success as an advisor, but 
should not be considered a guarantor of suitability.145   
Selection, according to the U.S. Army Special Forces Assessment and Selection 
(SFAS) course “assesses potential and qualities through behavioral observation, analysis 
via performance measure, and recording data.”146  While SFAS is an actual activity that 
applicants attend, assessment begins prior to their arrival.  Special Forces actually have a 
dedicated recruiting element that vets applicant records and capabilities before they 
attend SFAS.147  Because advisory personnel must also be unique, selection should limit 
the candidate pool to “individuals who have the necessary professional competence 
[along with ‘cultural empathy’ or cross-cultural sensitivity’] or can be taught it in a short 
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time. . . . [in addition to those with] high motivation and intelligence, social ease, 
communication skills, adaptability to different food and customs, and organizational and 
leadership ability.”148  To determine this entails both administrative examination of files, 
along with an on-site evaluation of each individual in the following areas:  intelligence, 
trainability, physical fitness, motivation, ability to influence others, and judgment.149 
Current selection criteria reflect attempts to mass-produce transition teams for the 
rapidly increasing Iraqi Security Forces.  Individuals currently undergoing training at Fort 
Riley, KS, and Fort McCoy, WI, along with those employed in-theater represent a 
significant cross-section of the U.S. military.  According to U.S. Army Human Resources 
Command, the only true requirements for selection to advisory duties are that individuals 
volunteer, or are involuntarily assigned based on “dwell time.” 150  The potential exists 
for individuals reporting for advisory training who have not fired a weapon in several 
years, soldiers (from both active and reserve components) who cannot meet physical 
requirements (they fail the APFT or are physically unable to carry required personal 
protective equipment, etc), individuals with racist views toward local or third-country 
nationals, and personnel who simply do not want to be advisors.151  Indeed there are 
some instances of personnel reporting to Ft. Riley whose physical limitations prevent 
them from fully participating in necessary training activities, or who are unable to pass 
even the Army Physical Fitness Test.152  Meanwhile, the lack of prior preparedness to 
conduct military duties (let alone advisory tasks) results in significant amounts of training 
time spent on honing basic soldiering tasks.  During the 11-week transition team training 
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at Fort Riley, approximately 70% of the time is spent on basic military training, and 30% 
on advisor-specific training.153  Therefore, advisor-specific tasks are not fully addressed 
and the result is lower levels of potential performance by fielded transition teams.   
As a former U.S. advisor in El Salvador has remarked, “good soldiers are the 
starting point, but by themselves are not enough.”154  The outstanding performance of an 
individual in a conventional troop-command billet must not be the sole determining 
factor;  the “undiluted military officer, accustomed to command and limited by tradition 
to military considerations, sometimes falls far short of qualifying for counterinsurgent 
warfare, where he alone often represents all the departments and activities of the United 
States.”155  Indeed, as a USMC officer with advisory experience in Iraq has noted, 
“[s]everal Marines with solid reputations have proven to be ineffective advisors because 
they lacked the patience to work within a culture that places little emphasis on qualities 
that we regard as being indispensable to military life.”156  Conversely, outstanding 
advisors may display traits that cut against accepted “command” characteristics, such as 
“[a] marked empathy with others, an ability to accommodate, a certain unmilitarily 
philosophical or reflective bent, a kind of waywardness or independence, and the like” 
although the individuals must maintain mission-orientation, well being, appearance, and 
overall tone of both U.S. and indigenous troops, at the highest standard.  In fact, as the 
U.S. advisor commanding general who offered this description further went on to say 
“we need to look for good advisors who may not be all-purpose officers.”157 
A Special Forces veteran who advised troops in Vietnam, Thailand, and Korea 
noted in 1965 that “[w]e are still using the age-old approach to our newly acquired 
problem, and professional competence and military know-how are considered as the 
dominating factors in selecting advisors.”158  This seems true today, too, with general 
                                                 
153  Cavagnol. 
154  Banner., p. 73. 
155  Jones, p. 15. 
156  Milburn and Lombard, pp. 112-113. 
157  Cushman, p. 51. 
158  Hudlin, p. 46. 
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selection criteria based on volunteering or involuntary assignment.  Involuntary 
assignment to a transition team can be expected by any soldier who meets varied criteria 
displaying military proficiency, along with twelve months or more of “dwell time.”159  
The following briefing slide identifies the emphasis that the Army is placing on these 
teams.160 
PEOPLE ALWAYS. . . MISSION FIRST!
Military Transition Teams (MTT)
• Resourcing these teams with the right Soldiers is one of the Army’s top 
priorities
• TT assignments provide important developmental opportunities for the 
Army’s 21st Century leaders 
• Only fully qualified officers and NCO’s are chosen to fill these critical 
positions, based upon their grade, skill, and experience match, balanced 
with dwell.
• New Language for Board MOI’s for officers who have served on 
Transition Teams
• Majority of assignments do not offer a choice of PCS locations; only 
transition team offer this as an incentive to Soldiers.  PCS to Kuwait or Fort 
Riley with further TCS to the deployed theater of operations.
• MTT assignments entitle Soldiers to a follow-on assignment of choice within 
Army Requirements. 
• Teach and mentor Iraqi and Afghani officers and Soldiers
 
Figure 2.   Military Transition Team (MTT) Emphasis 
As a currently-serving battalion commander for the development of transition teams 
remarked, “soldiers have been posted to this unit ‘on an ad hoc basis’ and few of the 
officers selected to train them have ever been advisers themselves.”161 
Subsequent interviews with various representatives from the U.S. Army Human 
Resources Command further clarify assignment goals.  Team chiefs are generally 
                                                 
159  “Armor Branch Chief Notes.”  Human Resources Command, Armor Branch Website, (URL:  
https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/Active/oparmor/talking_points.doc), accessed October 3, 2007. 
160  U.S. Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command website.  Combat Service Support 
Division PowerPoint briefing, (URL:  
www.sddc.army.mil/EXTRACONTENT/LPCC%20Briefings/01_SDDC%20PCC%20Brief%20Final-
9%20Feb%2007.ppt), accessed October 22, 2007. 
161  Kaplan,  “Challenging the Generals.”   
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selected based on their past performance, especially performance in past leadership 
positions.  Other officers on these teams receive transition team assignments based on 
their availability and not just past performance.  The non-commissioned officers assigned 
to the teams typically are similarly selected.162 
While there are certainly desired attributes for all these individuals, in reality the 
population of transition team personnel varies.  In essence, volunteers are eagerly 
accepted with minimal regard to actual qualifications and / or abilities.  For example, one 
recent transition team candidate was an older female non-commissioned officer.  Clearly, 
she might not be the most suitable candidate to conduct combat advisory activities with a 
misogynistic Iraqi military organization.  Furthermore, poor technical and tactical 
abilities, along with physical weaknesses, may turn her (or someone like her) into a 
liability for her comrades-in-arms.  Yet, she is nevertheless going to be assigned to an 
operational transition team in Iraq. 
In contrast to the take-all-comers approach still in effect for the transition teams 
themselves, there is some movement towards ensuring qualified individuals return to 
advisory-related training and operational tasks at Fort Riley, KS.  Some personnel also 
return to transition teams for follow-on deployments, or to cadre assignments with 1-1 
ID. 
As far back as the Korean War, adequate selection of advisors was considered 
critical.  As one report listed the recommended traits back then:163 
- The officer’s professional competence, preferably demonstrated by 
command experience – including combat command if possible – for 
advisors to line units. 
- Special screening of officers and enlisted men for qualities temperament 
and fortitude to withstand the strenuous psychological and physical 
demands of advisory duty in tactical units of a local national army, 
particularly under combat conditions. 
                                                 
162  Warren Sponsler, U.S. Army Armor Branch Majors Assignments Manager, personal interview 
conducted in Spring, 2007. 
163  Ramsey, p. 22. 
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- Personal characteristics of tact, patience, emotional stability, self-
sufficiency,  and self-discipline that will enable the officer to work 
effectively and  harmoniously with local national personnel and that 
will induce a respect and  confidence in Americans and the U.S. 
- Preference to officers with facility in the local language. 
An early study of advisory efforts in Vietnam likewise determined that vigilant 
selection of advisory personnel would redress many of the shortcomings identified in 
those sent to be advisors.  This study recommended the following selection criteria:164 
- To ensure strong motivation for the task, it would be well to place 
advisory service on a voluntary basis if at all possible. 
- Whether service is compulsory or voluntary, a careful screening process 
should  be devised to test a candidate’s suitability from the point of view of 
(a) professional equipment [essentially the candidate’s experience and 
performance];  (b) adaptability to foreign cultures; (c) a temperamental 
disposition, especially in the case of prospective field advisors, to share 
dangers, hardships, exotic food, and primitive shelter with members of an 
oriental civilization; (d) existing linguistic skills or the ability to acquire 
languages easily; (e) the possibility of “culture fatigue” in a man who, 
though otherwise qualified, has had too many overseas assignments and is 
not keen on another. 
As has already been noted, selection of advisory personnel should be conducted in 
three specific steps.  First is the screening of possible advisory personnel.  This entails 
identifying eligible servicemembers, and then analyzing their qualifications.  Second, 
candidates should be assessed for their suitability.  Finally, they must be continually 
monitored and evaluated in order to ensure that they remain capable of performing in the 
intense, obscure, and often remote environment in which advisors operate. 
In order to help with self-selection for advisory duty, individuals must clearly 
understand the advisor’s roles prior to competing for this assignment.  While there is 
copious literature that discusses transition teams and advisor-related duty now available 
to the military community, some effort must be made by the organization to characterize 
advisor traits, missions, and expectations.  By identifying the “good, the bad, and the 
                                                 
164  Hickey, p. 124. 
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ugly,” – especially the bad and the ugly – clearly inappropriate candidates may “deselect” 
themselves.  Providing as transparent a depiction of life on a transition team as possible 
should assist people in deciding whether they are suited for this duty.   
A. SCREENING 
The initial requirement for determining selection is identification of the 
population eligible to become advisors.  This thesis assumes that the entire U.S. Army, to 
include all Reserve Components, will provide the candidates.165  However, while all 
personnel must be considered eligible to apply for advisory duties, there must be specific 
individual pre-selection qualification criteria met prior to moving on to further selection 
processes. 
The initial screening process generally serves to screen people out, with the aim 
“to detect an unwanted substance or attribute.”166  A possible method for screening 
individuals recommended by a USMC officer is: 
- Screening by the monitor for suitability.  Preference should be given to 
those  Marines, officer and enlisted, who have been instructors or have 
already served advisory tours. 
- Command endorsement, completed and signed by the Marine’s 
commanding officer. 
- Individual or group interview by key FMTU [Foreign Military Training 
Unit] personnel, to include former advisors. 
- Probationary status until completion of the basic advisor course.  This 
can be accomplished by issuing the Marine temporary additional duty 
orders for the course.167 
                                                 
165  A possible topic for future study must be the inclusion of all Armed Forces components, along 
with local, state, and federal governmental employees in advisory teams.  Institutions such as the 
Department of State, state governmental institutions, and even municipal law enforcement agencies may 
serve to provide a significant talent pool that can be co-opted into federal service. 
166  screening. (n.d.). The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. 
Retrieved October 02, 2007, from Dictionary.com website: 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/screening 
167  Milburn and Lombard, p. 113. 
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While the above offers an excellent set of guidelines, it may be too broad in some 
areas (such as suitability preferences), yet too narrow in others (such as individual 
interviews just given the larger size of the Army versus the Marine Corps).  Accordingly, 
the following table offers a more specific set of guidelines: 
 
Screening Criteria Selection Criteria Deselection Criteria Comments 
Chain of Command 
Recommendation 
DA Form 4187 from 
first O6-level 
commander stating that 
the applicant is fully 
qualified to participate 
in the advisory selection 
process 
DA Form 4187 states 
that individual is not 
qualified to participate 
in the advisory selection 
process;  narrative must 
be included that 
indicates the particular 
reasons that the 
candidate is not 
qualified, with 
concurrence by the first 
General Officer in the 
Soldier’s chain of 
command 
Future DA policy must 
state that any individual 
desiring to compete for 
advisory selection will 
be allowed;  no 
application will be 
denied without 
supporting 
documentation (as stated 
in Deselection Criteria) 
Security Clearance Must possess a 
minimum of SECRET 
clearance 
Individual has no 
security clearance 
Interim security 
clearance may be 
considered if SECRET 
clearance is pending 
Physical Readiness Must have completed 
and passed the Army 
Physical Fitness Test 
(APFT) within 90 days 
of application 
- APFT conducted >90 
days prior to application 
- Applicant failed APFT 
Applicants may take an 
APFT during in-
processing activities at 
the selection & 
assessment location at 




Must have qualified as a 
Marksman at a 
minimum, with both M9 
pistol and M4/M16-
series rifle within 90 
days of application 
- Weapons qualification 
>90 days prior to 
application 
- Failed to qualify on 
either weapon 
Individuals must be 
qualified on personal 
weapons prior to 
training to maximize 
efficiency of follow-on 
training;  either weapons 
qualification scorecards 
or “memoranda for 
record” are suitable 
proof of qualification 
Defense Language 
Aptitude Battery Score 
Minimum score of 85 Score below 85 Applicant must 
demonstrate the 
potential to develop 
foreign language skills;  
may be waiverable 
based on other 
qualifications 
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Screening Criteria Selection Criteria Deselection Criteria Comments 
Medical Readiness Current physical within 
one year of application 
identifying applicant as 
“fit for duty” (Initial 
Medical Review – 
Annual Medical 
Certificate, DA 7349, 
March 2002) 
- Physical completed >1 
year prior to application 
- Physical identifies 
applicant as “not fit for 
duty” 
Applicants must be 
determined healthy 
within this window 
because the expectation 
is that duties will be in 
remote locations for 
long durations 
Civilian Education / 
Background / 
Experiences 
None None Outstanding 
qualifications may be 
used as a basis to allow 
participation in training, 
or as a mitigating factor 
to shortcomings in other 
screening criteria at the 
discretion of the 
selection & assessment 
unit commander 
Table 2.   Proposed Combat Advisor Screening Criteria 
Each specific area is discussed in more detail below. 
1. Chain of Command Recommendation 
The applicant must submit a Department of the Army Form 4187 (Request for 
Personnel Action) stating the intent to participate in selection for transition team 
assignment. 168  This form will be furnished through the chain of command to the first 
Colonel / O6-level commander for recommendation of approval or disapproval. 
An approved application will include the applicant’s current Army Physical 
Fitness Test (APFT) Scorecard, a memorandum for record identifying current weapons 
qualification status, and a statement that the applicant meets all preliminary selection 
requirements.169 
A disapproved application will include a memorandum for record identifying the 
reasons for recommending disapproval of the application.  Specific information 
                                                 
168  Department of the Army, “DA Form 4187: Personnel Action,” January 2000. 
169  Department of the Army, “DA Form 705: Army Physical Fitness Test Scorecard,” June 1999.  For 
the statement of certifies the three, there is no pre-existing format.  For such a document, possible inclusion 
of this information on the DA 4187 is possible 
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pertaining to the disqualification criteria must be addressed.  Applicants may dispute any 
denied application.  However, dispute processes will not be addressed in this thesis. 
The applicant’s chain of command is responsible for the submission of all packets 
to the office with proponency for fielding transition teams whether recommending or 
opposing the individual for advisory duty.  This allows the organization responsible for 
fielding transition teams to consider packets not approved by local commanders so as to  
prevent commanders from arbitrarily denying personnel from leaving their units. 
Commanders would thus not only be personally responsible for the quality of applicants 
they do send, but won’t be able to keep all quality individuals in their units.   
2. Security Clearance   
The nature of tactical operations and advisory activities requires a reliable 
individual who can be expected to access and protect classified information.  Advisors 
will participate in sensitive planning activities, assessments, and operations while 
working with indigenous forces.  Individuals lacking the basic ability to meet these 
requirements should not be selected for a transition team.  However, if the individual’s 
security clearance process has been initiated and he is reasonably expected to be granted 
a SECRET clearance at a minimum, then the individual may be provided a waiver 
accompanied by an interim SECRET clearance.170 
3. Physical Readiness   
Applicants must arrive for the “Assessment Phase” in satisfactory physical 
condition.  The common basis for determination of a Soldier’s level of physical fitness is 
the Army Physical Fitness test, consisting of timed muscular strength and endurance 
activities (two minutes each for push-ups and sit-ups), and a timed two-mile run to test 
cardiovascular endurance.  The minimum standards for passing this test serve as a 
benchmark to indicate an individual’s ability to physically accomplish battlefield tasks.  
                                                 
170  U.S. Army.  AR 380-67:  Personnel Security Program.  Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
Washington, DC, Paragraph 7-101, p. 24.  This regulation proscribes the appropriate criteria and 
procedures for granting personnel security clearances. 
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Furthermore, the APFT is familiar across all branches and units of the U.S. Army, 
because every Soldier is required to pass this test semi-annually.171   
The reason this test should be successfully completed in advance of selection to 
attend the Assessment Phase is that current demands preclude extensive physical 
conditioning.  In short, assessment and training must focus on activities that directly 
relate to the advisory mission;  extra attention paid to the Army’s baseline requirements 
simply cost too much time.   
At the same time, the inclusion of additional training requirements, such as pull-
ups, 12-mile timed roadmarches, or 5-mile timed runs could unnecessarily disqualify 
individuals capable of serving on transition teams.172   
4. Weapons Qualification   
The requirement for proof of prior weapons qualification mirrors the general idea 
of requiring all personnel to be proficient on common weapons systems.  Once again, 
dedicating additional training time to skills that are already required by regulation 
detracts from training.  Individuals who fail to qualify on the necessary weapons, or 
whose qualification is more than 90 days old on the date of application, should be 
considered ineligible for selection until qualification is accomplished. 
5. Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) Score   
Transition teams will train, fight, and live with indigenous forces.  Team members 
must have some identified proclivity to developing some skills in the local dialect.  The 
current standard for determining this is the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB).  
This test utilizes a fictional language, and the test-taker is expected to display the ability 
to “learn” a foreign language based on rudimentary instruction.   
                                                 
171  U.S. Army.  FM 21-20:  Physical Fitness Training (with Change 1).  Headquarters, Department of 
the Army, Washington, DC, October 1, 1998. 
172 Some U.S. Army specialty training schools, such as Airborne, Ranger, Air Assault, and Special 
Forces require specialized physical fitness qualification standards in order to participate in the training 
activity. 
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The current standard for an individual to be enrolled in formal basic Arabic 
language training at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) is a score of 100.173   
However, individuals selected for specialized linguistic training are expected to serve as 
stand-alone interpreters / translators (I/Ts).  This score should be relaxed for transition 
team candidates, because though they will be expected to have some understanding of 
local dialects, they will have native-speaker I/Ts available for the conduct of most daily 
tasks.  The ability to develop a working knowledge of the local dialect helps to set 
conditions for further development during advisor training in the U.S., and practical day-
to-day application while with the indigenous unit.  In reviewing potential foreign 
language capability, it must be noted that for Category I languages (such as French or 
Spanish), the individuals who attained a DLAB score of 85 or greater were most likely to 
complete the language training curriculum at the Defense Language Institute.174  
Therefore, to develop a rudimentary capability in Arabic it is recommended that the 
baseline score for advisor candidates be 85. 
Finally, existing linguistic capabilities must be identified and emphasized during 
the selection process independent of DLAB scores.175  Multi-lingual personnel, even 
those without local language capability, may acquire additional language skills more 
easily than mono-lingual personnel.  Therefore, some ability to “waive” lower DLAB 
scores among these individuals must be considered. 
6. Medical Readiness   
The requirements to field effective transition teams within constrained timelines 
necessitate the full medical readiness of transition team candidates.  To ensure the highest 
probability of success, a recent medical physical exam must certify the individual as fit 
                                                 
173  U.S. Army.  Defense Language Institute Online Catalog, 
http://www.dliflc.edu/academics/academic_affairs/dli_catalog/resident.htm (accessed October 2, 2007). 
174  Chin Han Wong.  “An Analysis of Factors Predicting Graduation of Students at Defense 
Language Institute Foreign Language Center.”  Naval Postgraduate School Masters Degree Thesis, 
Monterey, CA, December 2004. 
175   U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, p. C-1. 
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for duty.  In the instance of a candidate who is declared not fit, follow-on medical 
examinations must be conducted prior to assignment to the Assessment Phase.   
The recent requirement for U.S. Army personnel to receive an annual Periodic 
Health Assessment (PHA) means that medical issues should be identified that previously 
may have only been identified during the complete physical exam conducted every five 
years.  The PHA also integrates information from routine or emergency clinic visits into a 
database.  Combining the PHA with a mandatory Annual Health Assessment will 
minimize extra requirements for medical examinations of advisory candidates.  The final 
approval for an individual to conduct advisory duties is certification by the medical 
provider that the soldier is fit to deploy to an “austere” environment for at least 30 
days.176 
7. Civilian Education / Background / Experiences   
Pertinent advisory skills are not necessarily only martial in nature.  Indeed, “most 
successful advisors tend to be those whom life experience and personality have qualified 
for the role.”177  The candidate’s background, to include language skills, ethnicity, 
educational degrees, prior overseas residence, and civilian employment should be 
considered for what they offer to the advisory mission.178  Furthermore, fully qualified 
applicants with unique backgrounds may be selected for placement within specific teams 
to broaden the team’s operational capability.  For example, it may be highly beneficial for 
a second-generation Iraqi-American whose family emigrated from Tikrit, to be assigned 
to a Military Transition Team that will be operating with an Iraqi Army unit assigned to 
Salaheddin province.  Likewise, an advisor who was a bank employee in civilian life may 
be earmarked for an Iraqi Army administrative unit Military Transition Team (regardless 
of his current Military Occupational Specialty).  Lastly, a Reservist employed with 
                                                 
176  Francis J. Harvey and Peter J. Schoomaker.  “Periodic Health Assessment.”  Memorandum for 
selected Department of the Army elements, Washington, DC, October 12, 2006.  This document directs 
that all commands are responsible for ensuring that their personnel maintain medical readiness, and for 
commands to ensure that any medical issues be addressed in a timely manner. 
177  Hickey, p. 146. 
178  Franklin Lindsay.  Beacons in the Night.  Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1993. 
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civilian law enforcement may be a perfect candidate to be assigned to an intelligence 
position within a transition team, given the “criminal nature” of counterinsurgent 
networks. 
The current selection criteria do very little to field personnel appropriate to 
advisory missions.  In order to truly “select” individuals, there must be actual criteria in 
place that address the anticipated assignment based on the requirements of that 
assignment.  Clear criteria to “select” and “deselect” should be put in place by those who 
are intimately familiar with the specific mission requirements.  As such, the individual 
attributes of the eligible population must be thoroughly evaluated against what is needed 
and volunteers should be screened for their advisory potential as opposed to their 
“promotion potential” or potential to simply fill a slot.  Only properly qualified personnel 
should be assigned to teams, though the ideal would be for specific personnel to be 
assigned to specific teams based on their individual capabilities and history. 
B. ASSESSMENT 
This phase should be conducted at a centralized location for all applicants who 
pass through the screening process.  The most likely location for this activity is Fort 
Riley, KS, because that where all current transition teams train.  The assessment process 
should consist of a battery of objective and subjective evaluations that determine the 
suitability of these individuals for advisory duties.  The evaluation should measure 
psychological, intellectual, and interpersonal skills.  Table 3 identifies the general 
requirements to be evaluated during the Assessment Phase and each is discussed in 







 Selection Criteria Deselection Criteria Comments 
Physical Demonstrates the 




maintaining pace with 
the rest of the team 
Subjective judgement 
by team leadership 
and cadre 
Psychological Demonstrates sound 
behavioral health 
Determined unfit for 








Intellectual Demonstrates the 
ability to understand 
advanced concepts;  
provide written and 
spoken information 
Unable to grasp 
concepts;  poor written 
and spoken skills 
Subjective;  
performance-based in 
conjunction with team 
leadership and cadre 
Interpersonal Demonstrates the 
ability to operate with 
a small team 
Incapable of 
maintaining bearing or 
relationship with team 
members 
Subjective judgement 
by team leadership 
and cadre 
Table 3.   Proposed Combat Advisor Selection Criteria 
1. Physical Assessment   
As alluded to previously, the APFT requirement provides a benchmark for the 
physical fitness of incoming candidates.  However, the modern operating environment 
requires more than cursory physical tasks.  In particular, soldiers must operate with heavy 
loads that include body armor, weapons (M4, M9, possibly including M203 Grenade 
Launcher), ammunition (or devices that simulate appropriate weight for an individual’s 
basic load), water, along with necessary other items.  Based on after actions reviews of 
combat personnel in Iraq, soldiers must be expected to perform all tasks while fully 
equipped, to include climbing, extended chases, casualty evacuation, detention of enemy 
personnel and, most obviously, conducting actual combat operations.179  Accordingly, 
soldiers must prove capable of operating with this gear during the assessment phase.  All 
aspects of the assessment phase must be conducted with full combat gear to identify  
 
                                                 
179  Todd J. Clark.  “Train for the Fight.”  ARMOR Magazine, Fort Knox, KY, May-June 2004. 
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individuals incapable of sustained operations.  In general, the physical assessment will 
simply consist of conducting daily activities without significant impediment due to the 
increased equipment load.   
2. Psychological Assessment   
Forward-deployed units embedded with indigenous forces can expect to operate 
in austere environments with minimal and sometimes ambiguous command guidance.  
Living conditions for Iraqi forces are far different from U.S. military norms.  Likewise, 
the physical separation of advisory teams from U.S. forces in many cases forces 
significant improvisation for both living arrangements and activities.  To ensure that 
teams adapt in a way that is congruent with U.S. interests and command intent, advisors 
must display “persistence, forcefulness, and patience, as well as judgment to know which 
quality is going to be most effective in a particular situation.180  Because personnel who 
are patient, perseverant, reflective, and empathetic appear to perform well,  these 
attributes should be carefully evaluated during training, and also by behavioral health 
personnel who specialize in behavioral assessments.181 
Corporate research as early as the 1960s revealed that simple attention to 
identifying psychological characteristics can signify the potential to successfully 
complete overseas assignments.  That, in turn, can increase selection efficiency.  For 
instance, the Standard Oil Company provided a claim of a 20% increase in such selection 
efficiency by simply using “six standardized psychological tests during the selection 
process.”182 
Qualified Behavioral Health Specialists should administer a series of tests, to 
include the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT).183  The TAT is “used to stimulate stories 
or descriptions about relationships or social situations and can help identify dominant 
                                                 
180  Milburn and Lombard, p. 112. 
181  JCISFA.  “Transition Team Handbook (Draft),” p. 3. 
182  Hickey, p. 172. 
183  Fittante.   
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drives, emotions, sentiments, conflicts and complexes.”184  The test is administered to a 
group of candidates and completed in written form by each individual.  This can provide 
a basis by which to judge how an individual will perform with small teams in an isolated 
austere environment.  The specialist or assessor would then determine whether the 
individual is qualified or disqualified for advisor duty, or whether he warrants a follow-
up examination. 
In the search for likely advisors, military and civilian cadre will ideally find 
candidates who “like their work and have the right personality for it.”185  For example, a 
candidate who frequently loses control of his emotions, fails to accomplish required tasks 
when under mental duress, or significantly (and grossly) changes his routine, may not be 
suited to operate in a relatively autonomous combat advisory environment.  Final 
determinations of fitness should be based on the evaluations of both military and mental 
health professionals. 
3. Intellectual Assessment   
Complex situations that are encountered in advisory environments demand that 
individuals be capable of making rapid, correct decisions, and concise plans of action.  
These plans must be based on accomplishing the desired end state given available assets.  
Individuals must demonstrate consistent logical reasoning and critical thinking to ensure 
that the mission is accomplished.  In short, individuals who are selected to proceed to the 
actual transition team training must be intelligent problem-solvers who are decisive and 
able to plan and execute quickly and effectively. 
4. Interpersonal Assessment   
Transition teams operate within larger units.  The teams routinely spend large 
amounts of time conducting operations that require synchronization, extensive 
coordination, and group harmony.  Each member of the team must be a “team player” 
                                                 
184  H.A. Murray, PhD.  “TAT (Thematic Apperception Test).”  Pearson Assessments for Clinical and 
Psychological Use, (URL:  http://www.pearsonassessments.com/tests/tat.htm), accessed October 5, 2007. 
185  Hickey, p. 146. 
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who flourishes while working with a group.  These critical skills should be assessed 
through peer reviews and evaluations, and also by cadre observations, while the candidate 
is “in an environment that closely resembles the one he will encounter on the job.”186  
Individuals deemed to be incapable of extended operations in an environment requiring 
close and effective teamwork must be assessed as “not suited for advisory duties.” 
C. SELECTION FOR ADVISORY DUTIES 
Research during the Vietnam War showed that, “[w]ithout doubt, finding the 
officers and men capable of becoming outstanding advisors is the single most important 
step” for assisting host nation forces.187  The end state of pre-selection and assessment is 
either “selection” or “deselection” to proceed to the formal advisor training regimen 
conducted by units at Fort Riley, KS.  Selection represents “[a] carefully chosen or 
representative collection of people.”188  Such a process would provide the U.S. Army 
those personnel most suited to be military advisors to indigenous forces.   
Only those physically, mentally, and professionally prepared for advisor duties 
should be selected.  Further, a properly conducted selection process will accomplish the 
following:189 
- Eliminate those individuals whose motivation is low or are basically 
incapable of adapting themselves to another culture. 
- Identify individuals, although “well qualified by personality and 
experience to do the job successfully,” cannot adjust to the environment or 
counterparts. 
By deselecting personnel not capable of performing advisory duties, the U.S. 
Army will provide the “best and brightest” to the efforts in Iraq, thus facilitating the 
                                                 
186  Hickey, p. 173. 
187  Hickey, p. 147. 
188  selection. (n.d.). The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. 
Retrieved October 02, 2007, from Dictionary.com website: 
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189  Hickey, p. 146.  The author further notes on page 173 that “[S]kill cannot be separated from 
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redeployment of U.S. combat forces once security responsibilities have been successfully 
transferred from Coalition to Iraqi Security Forces.  However, to make selection 
sufficiently attractive, no negative stigma can be attached to “non-selected” personnel.  It 
has to be understood that they simply did not meet the peculiar criteria of advisor duties.  
Depending on the reason for deselection, candidates may be allowed to reattempt 
advisory selection in the future. 
Advisor monitoring and evaluation should be continuous to maintain the quality 
of advisor teams.  Assessment should not end with completion of advisory preparation 
activities.  Preliminary evaluations may err in estimating an individual’s potential.190  
Some personnel may not be capable of performing this mission for long periods.  Others 
may not be able to perform once deployed to a foreign, austere environment.  Either way, 
team members must constantly reassess their own fitness as well as that of their peers in 
order to ensure that mission critical activities can continue to be performed with as little 
disruption as possible. 
                                                 
190  Hickey, p. 174. 
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VI. TRANSITION TEAM PREPARATION ACTIVITIES 
The ability to advise a counterpart is an art which – as one authority on 
counterinsurgency has emphasized – has yet to be spelled out (and 
perhaps never  will be completely) in field manuals.  Yet, like leadership, it 
is a skill which can presumably be acquired through study and 
practice.191 
Two essential elements required to build effective transition teams are the 
appointment of skilled cadre that actually mold these teams, and the careful selection of 
advisory candidates because “the skills necessary for working with foreign nationals can 
be taught only partially.”192  Cadre are “[a] nucleus of trained personnel around which a 
larger organization can be built and trained.”193  As such, these personnel must be experts 
at the tasks they are assessing and instructing.  Cadre are currently selected based 
primarily on availability and are drawn largely from personnel currently stationed at Fort 
Riley.  Individuals may or may not have combat or advisory experience, although most 
will have some subject matter expertise and experience in task instruction.194  
Presumably all are military;  limited research confirms this assumption. 
All personnel who perform screening must be considered fully qualified based on 
their professional accreditation as medical doctors, psychologists, commanders, etc.  
Likewise, cadre members should be chosen based on their proven successful performance 
in advisory roles.   
At the moment, there is minimal integration of civilian experts into the training 
cadre.  Yet, career academics or former foreign-service personnel who have spent a 
lifetime gaining expertise in a specific subject matter, would be critical to ensuring that 
teams receive the right area-specific education during later preparation activities.  To 
                                                 
191  Denno, pp. 34-35. 
192  Hickey, p. 146. 
193  cadre. Dictionary.com. The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth 
Edition. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/cadre (accessed: June 
11, 2007). 
194  Note that in early- to mid-2006, an Army-wide call was put out to current / previous transition 
team member to transfer to Fort Riley, KS, to cadre assignments.   
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highlight the importance of adding civilian cadre (or “faculty”), it is worth pointing out 
that “[m]ilitary forces can perform civilian tasks but often not as well as the civilian 
agencies with people trained in those skills.  Further, military forces performing civilian 
tasks are not performing military tasks.”195  In essence, civilian experts are better utilized 
teaching subjects in their respective area of expertise, allowing military experts to teach 
military subjects.196 
The aim of incorporating training and education in both military and non-military 
topics is to create teams that are both competent and confident for their assignments in 
Iraq.  They must feel proficient in a number of areas in order to successfully assimilate 
and integrate into indigenous units.  Additionally, they need this proficiency in order to 
share their knowledge and develop indigenous forces.  Indeed, the ability to mentor and 
develop such forces is arguably the essence of their purpose.  Regardless of whether the 
preparation activity is training or education, there should be a maximum effort made to 
provide individuals with first-hand knowledge of the area of operations.197  Displaced or 
émigré Iraqis would make ideal role players in situational training activities.  Academic 
experts who hail from Iraq should also be incorporated whenever possible, along with 
other experts with extensive travel history to the region. 
Civilian subject matter experts who have dedicated their lives to mastery of a 
particular subject (anthropology, political science, religion, language, etc) should teach 
the non-military educational classes.  A model for a suggested schedule model may be 
found in the French Commando School located in Djibouti.198  Of note is that educational 
classes and military training tasks are alternated daily;  educational classes in the morning 
and training after noon, or vice versa.  Such a schedule allows material to be taught 
                                                 
195  U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, p. 2-9.  This document also states on page 3-2 that 
“university professors . . . can also be of great benefit.” 
196  U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, p. A-1.  By employing civilian “educators,” this may 
necessitate that the preparation activity takes on a “learning institution”-type attitude as a military training 
institution.  Further attention may be devoted to the benefit added to requiring completion of “scholastic” 
assignments such as reports, homework, tests, etc. 
197  U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, p. A-2. 
198  Bradley Shaver, Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps.  “American and French Forces Make History with 
Commando School.”  Military Connections website, December 7, 2003.  (URL:  
http://militaryconnections.com/news_story.cfm?textnewsid=685), accessed June 11, 2007.  
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cumulatively on multiple subjects over several days as opposed to one subject per day, 
similar to the way classes are run in civilian educational institutions (see Figure 3).  It 
also permits alternating sedentary in-the-classroom and physically strenuous training 
activities. 
 
 Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
0600-0730 
  Team Physical Training 
0900-1050 
  Arabic 
1000-1150 




















Combat Life Saver (CLS) 
1900-0550 Leader 
meeting 




Figure 3.   Sample proposed daily team schedule. 
Teams must conduct all preparatory activities, to include classroom education, as 
a unit.  Shared hardships and constant interaction facilitate team building and produce the 
esprit de corps necessary for small units in combat situations.  This also allows some 
level of cohort selection / deselection in that team members can observe each others’ 
actions, and perhaps provide feedback to cadre members. 
The preparation period must allow the opportunity for team building and 
interpersonal development.  By providing the teams freedom outside of their training 
schedule, members can conduct team-building activities.  These activities may include 
team meetings, team outings, problem-solving activities, etc..199  The aim should be to 
produce a small unit capable of conducting virtually independent operations in a hostile 
environment for approximately one year – while still cohering.  Meanwhile, 
consideration also needs to be given to family time and family team-building since team 
members will need to feel confident that their families are likewise cohering in their 
absence.   
                                                 
199  Cavagnol. 
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After the initial selection of advisor candidates, individuals can be assigned to a 
“specialty position.”  Ideally, the team leader would select individuals to be “specialists” 
who already have particular skills or interests:  e.g., someone with automotive skills 
would be assigned to maintenance training, a weapons-savvy individual would become a 
weapons specialist, personnel proficient with communications equipment would attend 
that block of instruction, etc.  Some of this can be based on an individual’s primary 
military occupational specialty, additional skill identifiers, civilian background and 
education, or simply on an individual’s preferences or hobbies.  A fringe benefit from 
slotting an individual into a subject with which he feels comfortable is that he will retain 
interest in the subject and that ensures that he will get the most out of the training.   
The end state of the institutional training activity should produce enough qualified 
teams to embed with each identified Iraqi unit.  At the end of training, the teams should 
be capable of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of all team missions.200  
Each team must emerge from Fort Riley capable of being:  “[embedded as a] link with 
partner unit, [a]dvisors to the Iraqi Command, [r]esources to Coalition Units to better 
their understanding of Iraqi units, [p]art of The Team, NOT [only] liaison, NOT a fire 
and forget mission, NOT  a supporting effort, [and] NOT part of the Iraqi Chain of 
Command.”201 
The figure below sketches one possible way to arrange all of this:  selection, 
preparation, and unity of effort.  By creating a relatively flat organization under the 
purview of the Iraqi Assistance Group, it could complete two critical tasks.  First, 
“provide [the advisor] with a background of knowledge and techniques that will be useful 
in the country to which he is assigned; . . . [and] reinforce skills that will enable him to 
continue his education while on the job.”202   
 
                                                 
200  U.S. Army.  FM 3-24:  Counterinsurgency, p. 6-15. 
201  JCISFA, “Advisor Basics.” 




Figure 4.   Proposed Organizational Structure for Transition Team Preparation. 
Second, such a structure could include a dedicated element responsible for the selection 
and deselection of personnel prior to their arrival at the preparation phase.  This would 
help save time, effort, and money.  Those least likely to meet the organization’s standards 
would be pre-screened.   
Lastly, this proposed structure has an integrated preparation component that 
includes both military training and civilian education.  It reflects the need for 
specialization in that professional educators provide the non-military education 
component.  Military cadre, composed of leaders who have successfully conducted 
indigenous force advisory missions, maintain the mentorship and leadership of this 
organization.  The remaining military training instructor positions that are not specifically 
oriented on advisor skills may be filled by Army trainers qualified in the focus subject 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The years ahead . . . are crucial ones and good advisors will be needed as 
much as or more than ever.  An informal “selection board” or screening 
group, at DA [Department of the Army] level, made up of former advisors, 
which reviewed records and interviewed, even motivated, likely 
candidates, would be one way of insuring senior level advisor quality as 
well as indicating highest level interest.203 
Given this passage from a debriefing report written by the Commanding General 
of the Delta Regional Assistance Command (part of the larger Military Assistance 
Command Vietnam) in the early 1970s, the lost lessons of Vietnam seem particularly 
haunting in light of the mission in Iraq.  The intervening 30-plus years have seen much of 
the vision expressed here forgotten in the files of history.  Even the official “repository of 
advisory know-how,” the Military Assistance Institute at Fort Bragg, NC, which was the 
proposed location for such selection boards, can’t be found in internet searches today.  
The notable present efforts by the U.S. Army at Fort Riley, KS, and further development 
of advisory units by the U.S. Marine Corps (Special Operations Advisor Group – SOAG 
[formerly FMTU] and Security Cooperation Education and Training Center – SCBTC) 
clearly demonstrate that our military is aggressively seeking to regain its past proficiency.  
As a senior USMC officer has remarked, past experiences “lead to the conclusion that the 
[advisory effort’s] success in preparing advisors will hinge upon two key components – 
selection and training.”204 
Of note too is that “[m]odern weapons in ill-trained hands are actually less 
effective than primitive weapons.” 205  Having outstanding weapons systems adds 
minimally to combat power if the personnel using that equipment do not master its 
application.  In essence, military forces that are not well trained are generally ineffective.  
This is the reason it is so critical to employ the best quality transition teams to Iraq.  Put 
                                                 
203  Cushman, p. 51. 
204  Andrew R. Milburn and Mark C. Lombard.  “Marine Foreign Military Advisors:  The Road 
Ahead,”  in Ramsey, p. 112. 
205 Robert O’Connell.  “Low Intensity Conflict in Europe and the Transcauscus”.  Naval Postgraduate 
School lecture, Monterey, CA, May 1, 2007. 
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most simply, as the Iraqi forces become “trained and equipped,” personnel must also be 
technically and tactically proficient enough to succeed on the battlefield without the 
omnipresence of U.S. forces.  The end state of providing transition teams to the Iraqi 
Security Forces is to build a competent and confident force, equipped with the tools and 
training to assume full responsibility for the security of the state of Iraq.  Although a 
clearly difficult task, “properly trained, prepared, and indoctrinated, the advisor can 
literally be a force multiplier.”206 
The selection, preparation, and employment of advisors must reflect the same sort 
of flexibility expected of the advisors themselves.  In order to maintain high standards 
and capabilities, “it [is] particularly important that there be provisions for continuing 
evaluation and for feeding the lessons of past experience into future planning, selection, 
and training processes.”207  If a better method becomes apparent, then institutional 
change must be implemented based on feedback from all aspects of the advisor program.   
Feedback is essential to maintain the flow of fully qualified advisory personnel, 
whether it is both “positive” or “negative.”208  In the long run, such information can help 
“make it possible to compare predicted performance with actual performance,” thereby 
facilitating decision making for necessary changes.209   
Positive feedback can be identified in terms of ‘number of candidates who applied 
and were accepted, compared to the stated goal,’ or ‘the number of teams required 
compared to the number of teams produced,’ or ‘the average successful completion rate 
versus the commander’s specified pass rate goal.’ 
Negative feedback would be best captured through After Action Reviews, internal 
audits, and client reviews (e.g., from the Iraqi Security Forces, Coalition Forces units, 
Department of State, etc).  As information and assessments from Iraq become available, 
the cadre and entire preparation apparatus should modify their procedures to meet 
                                                 
206  Strader, p. 94. 
207  Hickey, p. 157. 
208  David P. Hanna.  Designing Organizations for High Performance.  Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, New York, 1988.  Chapter 1, “ Understanding How Organizations Function,” pp. 14-16. 
209  Hickey, p. 173. 
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changing environmental requirements.  This method of feedback will be amplified by the 
inclusion of veteran advisors into the cadre, who will use their first-hand knowledge 
along with their observations about advisory selection and preparation to correct 
deviations given what they know is required in the field. 
The per capita U.S. Army advisory effort currently seems unprecedented in scope, 
yet is slowly improving given the experiences of its personnel.  However, it still remains 
tied to aged institutions that tend to favor traditional organizations over new ones.  Also, 
the mindset of many key leaders seems to remain set in the heavily regimented Army of 
the Cold War era, only grudgingly adapting from a primarily “conventional” mindset to a 
psyche immersed in unconventional warfare.210   
It should be clear by now that “properly led and advised Iraqi units [are] more 
effective than [U.S. forces]” at selected tasks, particularly those that are culturally-
based.211  In order to radically alter the focus of our military forces from conventional to 
unconventional operations, perhaps the best place to begin is with our learning 
institutions that prepare men for combat operations.  By introducing a radical redesign of 
the selection and preparation of our advisors, we should be able to more rapidly shift 
responsibility to Iraqi forces, and subsequently withdraw our own from Iraq. 
The mission in Iraq clearly requires outstanding U.S. military personnel to assist 
the Iraqi Security Forces in the stabilization and future security of their country.  This 
means individuals who can establish rapport and communicate effectively with host 
nation forces.  It is critical that these personnel not only be competent, but thoroughly 
dedicated to this mission.  Furthermore, the provision of such personnel must be among 
our highest priorities; “to succeed we have got to put into it all interest and skill we 
possess.”212 
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